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In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. HARO·LD 1IITCHELL, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
---~RRO\~VHE_A_D FREIGHT LINES, 
LTD., a corporation, and MARVIN C. 
Y'"AN PATTEN, 
Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S. BRIE:B""' 
STATE~IENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
7242 
All page referenc-es used are those of the record. 
The parti~es are referred to as in the court below. All 
italics are ours unless otherwise indicated. 
This is an action by the plantiff to recover for per-
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sonal injuries and da1nage to property sustained by him 
in a collision with the defendant corporation's truck, 
'vhich oc.curred on April3, 1947 at about 2,:15 p.m. Plain-
tiff was driving his 1946 Chevrolet pickup truck in a 
northerly direction on U. S. Highway 91 and upon r·each-
ing a point about 15 miles north of Paragonah, Utah, a 
dust storm enveloped the highway which rendered visi-
bility poor while plaintiff Wa's attempting to pull off on 
his side of thH highway, because of the density of the dust 
storm, a large freight truck and trailer o'vned by the de-
fendant corporation and being operated by the defendant 
Marvin C. Van Patten collided head-on with plaintiff's 
truck inflicting serious personal injuries on the plaintiff 
and demolishing his truck beyond repair. The defend-
ants' truck was attempting to pass another vehicle, which 
was towing a boat trailer and was proceeding in the same 
direction as defendants' truck when the collision oc-
curred on or near the shoulder on plaintiff's side of the 
highway. Plaintiff recovered a total verdict in the Dis-
tric.t Court of Salt Lake County, in the sum of $21,594 .. 22. 
T)efendants' n1otion for ne'v trial was presented to the 
trial judge, the Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., and on 
,June 26, 1948, 'vas by the c.ourt denied. 
In his complaint plaintiff alleged that the defend-
ants in the operation of their truck were negligent in 
the following partic.ulars : 
A. That U. S. Highway 91 at the point of collision 
was a two-lane public highway with 19·Y2 feet of pave-
Inent and four f~eet of gravel shoulders on each side~ that 
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said traffic lane~ "·ere \Yell marked and separated by a 
\Yell-defined yellow· linP, and that the defendants negli-
gently, carele~sly and recklessly drove their truck across 
the center line of said highway and across the traffic 
lane provided for northbound vehicles and onto the 
graveled shoulder on the extreme ~east side of the high-
"·ay into collision 'vith plaintiff's truck. 
B. That the defendants negligently, carelessly and 
heedlessly failed to n1aintain a proper lookout for plain-
tiff and for other vehicular traffic proceeding along said 
highway, in that defendants either failed to observe the 
presence of plaintiff~s truck on the extreme east shoulder 
of said high"\\.,.ay, or, having observed the same, failed 
to p·ay any heed or take any reasonable measures to 
avoid colliding with plaintiff's truck. 
C. That for sometime prior to, and at the time of 
the collision, a dust storm covered the highway and im-
paired visibility, and that under such circumstances it 
became and was the duty of the defendants to stop· their 
truck or 'to operate it at such a speed as would enable 
them to avoid colliding with other vehicular traffic upon 
the highway, including plaintiff's truck; but, nothwith-
standing said duty the defendants drove their heavy 
truck and trailer along said highway in the dust storm 
at an unreasonable and ·excessive rate of speed, under 
the circumstances, to-wit : at a sp·eed in excess of 15 
1niles p·er hour. 
Plaintiff further alleged that as a direct and proxi-
Inate result of the negligent acts and omissions of the 
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defendants he suffered severe, permanent, and disabling 
injuries which caused him excruciating pain and im-
paired his ability to ·perform work and earn his liveli-
hood. The specific injuries alleged and proved will be 
hereafter shown in the statement of facts. 
Plaintiff also claim·ed property damage to his truck 
and personal effe-cts in the amount of $1344.00. 
In the Answer, the defendants admitted that defend-
ant, Van Patten was the servant, agent and employee 
of the defendant corp·oration and that there was a colli-
sion bet\veen the plaintiff's vehicle and the defendants' 
truck which occurred on the shoulder east of the high-
way, about 15 miles north of Paragonah, Utah, but they 
deny that the collision was proximately caus~ed by any 
carelessness, or negligence on their part. Defendants 
also denied the allegations of the complaint with respect 
to plaintiff's injuries and special damage. 
As affirmative defenses the defendants alleged that 
\Yhile the defendants were on the left side of the high-
\vay-, passing a pass~enger car and trailer proceeding in 
the same direction, plaintiff approached from the oppo-
site direction on the wrong side· of the highway and sud-
dently and unexpectedly cut across the center line of the 
highway immediat~ely in front of defendants' truck, creat-
ing an emergency; and that the ensuing collision was 
solely caused or proximately contributed to by plaintiff's 
negligence in approaching defendants on the wrong side 
of the highway and unexp~ect~edly creating an emergency 
by turning across the highway immediately in front of 
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5 
defendant~, in failing to keep a proper look-out, in fail-
ing to keep his truck under proper and safe control, in 
failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid collision, and 
in driving his truck \vhile it was overloaded with four 
people in the front seat, ":hich interefered with his con-
trol of the truck. 
Plaintiff filed a reply den~ring the affirmative allega-
tions of defendants' answer. 
Defendants complain of th,e size of the verdict and 
eontend that certain erroneous instructions were given 
by the court and that certain rulings of the court with 
reBpect to the adlnission in evidence of the annuity 
tables (Exhibit X) were erro:qeous; but defendants al-
together fail to point out wherein the claimed erroneous 
instructions or rulings resulted in a miscarriage of 
justice. It has been long established in this jurisdiction 
that the jur~~ 's verdict will not be r~eversed in the absence 
of a sho\ving of prejudicial error, resulting in a miscar-
riage of justice (Sec. 104-39-3, Utah Code Ann~tated 
1943). The instructions given by the court were correct, 
except in those instanees where the court gave instruc-
tions more favorable to the defendant than justified hy 
la,v. Indeed, the court overemphasized defendants' 
theories of def.ense upon which, there was no substantial 
evidence. 
THE FACTS 
\\T e regard defendants' staten1ent of facts incomplete 
and disagree with their interpretation of the ~evidence. 
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We, therefore, deen1 it expedient to pres·ent to this court 
a n1ore co1n plete review o.f the evedence. 
The evidence is clear, convincing, -an·d uncontradicted 
that the collision occured on plaintiff's side of the high-
\va.y, near the east edge of the paved portion. Defend-
ants in their brief refer to a conflict in the eviden0e with 
respect tthe point of impact, which was described as 10 
or 15 feet east of the paved portion (R. 429) and again 
as 15 feet ·east of the center line (R. 454-5). Both ref-
erences were to testimony of the defendant Van Patten. 
The evidence is also clear, convincing, and uncontradicted 
that the def.endant was attempting to pass another 
vehie'Le at 'the time the co'llision occurred, notwithstanding 
the poor visibility caused by a dust s:torm which envel-
oped the high,vay. The defendant, howe·ver, sought to 
excuse his presence on the ·extreme wrong side of the 
highway by saying that as he was passing another ve-
hicle proceeding in the same direction, he saw 'P'laintiff 
approaching on the highway on the wrong side of the 
road, and that plaintiff's vehicle cut over creating an 
emergency which required hiln to turn off the wrong side 
to avoid collision. That defendant had considerable dif-
ficulty in respect to this amazing contention is indicated 
by his testimony. 
Defendant described his vehicle as being about 60 feet 
long ( R. 423). He testified that as he came ove.r the 
ridge, he could see a dust storm on the flats and as he 
proceeded onto the flats, he came onto a ear pulling 
an open two-wheel boat trailer; that he followed the 
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trailer for :2 or B nliles and that it 'vas pretty 'vindy and 
dusty ( R.. 424) ; that during one of the breaks in the 
~tor1u he started to pass the vehicle in front of hin1 and 
as he got about half 'vay alongside the trailer, he noticed 
a car coining up from th:e op·posite side. It seemed that 
plaintiff crossed the center line just as the defendant saw 
hi1n and he couldn't get back behind the car he was at-
ten1pting to pass, so he pulled con1pletely off the road 
·w·here the collision occurred; that the car he was attempt-
ing to pas~, 'vas going het,,reen 10 and 15 miles p1er hour 
(R. 425): that as he attempted to pass the other car he 
could Bee possibly 200 yards ahead and there we-re no 
cars coining from the opposite direction on the east side 
of the highway and there 'vere no cars coming from the 
opposite direction on the west half of the highway (R. 
426) ; that it see1ned like plaintiff's truck came from the 
center of the road or opposite side, like he crossed over 
(R .. 426); that the plaintiff's truck was possibly 100 
yards -n1aybe not that far, 'vhen he first saw him. De-
fendant believes that he got the whole truck and trailer 
off the road before the collision; that he turned off the 
highway when he saw the other car at about 45 degre·e 
angle (R. 427); that as he atten1pted to pass the other 
car, Van Patten shifted into third direct and was going 
possibly bet,veen 15 and 20 miles p·er hour (R. 429); 
that the point of impact was approxima'tely 10 or 15 feet 
off the highway and he didn't travel much over 5 or 10 
feet after the impact (R. 429) ; that the right front cor-
ner of defendants' truck collided with the left front 
corner of p1anti:ff 's (R. 430-1-2). 
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On cross-examination, the defendant, Van Patten, 
stated that he had no idea ho'v fast -plan tiff's truck vvas 
going when he hit it (R. 438) yet he· knows he_ was moving 
more than 5 miles per hour (R 439). 'Then he flies in 
the face of physics, and states that the small truck con-
tinued on in the direction it was n1oving after the impact, 
even though the right front corner of the heavy truck 
struck the left corner of the light truck, (R. 439). Van 
Patten knew there was a heavy dust storm enveloping 
the highway and he enter;ed it behind the car and trailer. 
He didn't like the idea of being behind anything. (R. 441) 
At the time the dust broke and he deeided to pass, he 
could_see about 200 ya.rds ahead of him, but in his sworn 
deposition before tria], he ·stated he could see just 100 
yards ahead (R. 442). Since the deposition, he has had 
time to compute the distance and he computes the dis-
tance at 200 yards. The break in the storn1 continued so 
he could continue to see 200 yards, ahead. (R. 443) He 
started to go about 20 miles p·er hour, or perhaps fa'Ster 
so he could pass the car and trailer and he realized at 
the time, that his equipment was 60 feet long and that 
he would have to have time to pass the other car and get 
back on his side of the road ( R. 444). He looked down 
both sides of the highway and saw the plaintiff's car 
just straddle the center line. (R. 446) He was watch-
ing the highway, both sides all the time. He was passing 
the other vehicle and he could see 200 yards down the 
high,vay, but he couldn't see plaintiff until he got within 
100 yards, at which time plaintiff was astraddle the 
center line. \/an Patten had no idea how fast plaintiff 
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\Vas g·omg-. He didn't have thne to either pass in front 
and get on his side or to stop and get behind, although 
he realized that 'vhen he passes traffic on a hig'hway in 
a dust stor1n, that is '\vhat he has to have tim~e to do. He 
kne''" fron1 his experience in traveling Highway 91, that 
it was a pretty busy highway 'vith ears going in both 
directions all the time, and he had in mind at the tin1e 
he started to pass, that out of the dust storn1 a car might 
come in another direction and he also realized how much 
distance he \Vould have to travel before he could safely 
pass the car he "-as passing (R. 447-448). He does not 
belieYe that he told the sheriff that when he first saw 
the other ear it 'vas 100 yards away, but if Sheriff Smith 
took the stand and testified that Van Patten told him 
the car "~as only 20 or 25 feet away, he could not say 
w··hether that 'vould be true or not. He may have told the 
8heriff that. (R. 451). We desire to quote the following 
testi1nony directly from the record, commencing near the 
bottom of page 451: 
"Q. You didn't think Mr. ~!itchell was to 
blame, did you~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. 1.,.. ou don't think that now, do you~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. In driving in the manner you have de-
scribed, you don't think you were to blame~ 
.. A.. No, sir. 
Q. You think you drove your truck on that 
occasion in a safe p·rudent way~ 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Despite the length and size of your truckT 
A. Yes. 
Q. Despite the visibility being restricted to 
the point it was~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were driving your truck in a safe 
way~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you drive it the same way now if 
you had an opportunity~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Under the same circumstances~ 
A. Yes.'' (R. 452). 
"\Tan Patten stated that the point of in1pact was 15 
feet east of the center line and that he proceeded off the 
highway on 'about a 45 degree angle prior to the imp~act 
(R. 455). He stated that his truck and trailer were 60 
feet long and assuming that the rear wheels of the trailer 
had l~eft the paved portion of the highway, he had to go 
at least ·60 feet on a 45 degree angle before the point of 
i1npact, yet that the eenter line of the high,vay was just 
15 feet from the point of impact. H.e admitted that that 
didn't add up and that the highway was about 19lj2 feet 
all the way across the paved portion; that he must have 
been mistaken about the angle he was traveling, and that 
he must also have been mistaken as to whether or not 
his entire trailer had left the highway prior to the impact 
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(R. 436) That at the tiine he vvas about to pass the said 
ear, he \Ya~ pretty well over in the east lane of traffic 
oYer 011 the east side of said high,vay, and that he didn't 
have to go very far before he got off the highway. He 
said that h-e sa 'v the ear 100 yards ahead coining in his 
direction fro1n the center of the road and that he, Van 
Patten, 'vas going approximately 20 miles an hour. He 
testified that being already practically off the pavement, 
he arrived at the point of imp1act at the same time the 
plaintiff's car did coming from the center and that the 
plaintiff's car was 100 yards a'vay from him. He stated 
that he n1ay have told Sheriff Smith, when he first saw 
the other car that it was 20 or 25 feet away (R. 457). 
Counsel for the defendant ma·de ~a desperate attempt 
to rescue the witness Van Patten, from his dilemma, with 
respBct to the distances involved in his testimony. We 
,fesire to quote from the record beginning a:t page 458 : 
'' Q. And when counsel has asked you certain 
distances by yards and feet, have you been p~ay­
ing attention as to whether he has asked you 
ho'v many yards or how many feet~ 
A. I believe I hav·e. 
Q. When y·ou first saw this ~fitchell truck, 
just to be clear on it, do you know how many 
feet that truck was away from you, by number of 
feet or by number of yards, either qne? 
A. When I first saw the Mitchell car, you 
m·ean' 
Q. Yes. 
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A. Not accurately, no. 
Q. And if you were to now state your best 
approximation taking into consideration your best 
estimate of that distance based on what you saw 
at that time and what your deductions have been 
since as to where the accident happened, how far 
would you say in feet that distance was across 
from you to the Mitchell truck, when you first 
saw it~ 
A. I couldn't say exactly in feet. It would 
only be an estimate on it at all. I am not a judge 
of distances. 
Q. Well, approximately in fe~et, if you can 
state~ 
A. Approximately 100 or 200 feet maybe. 
(R. 458). 
Q. Now, counsel asked you, when you saw 
that truck, if it wasn't 100 yards down the high-
way' 
A. No. 
Q. Did you so understand him when he 
asked you that question~· 
A. I believe that is the way it was, in yards. 
Q. In yardst 
A. No, I don't believe it was in yards. 
Q. You don't believe it would be 100 yards~ 
A. No. 
Q. If you answer~ed counsel's question to 
that effect, you mistook yards for feet, did you 
not~ 
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~\. \~ es, sir. 
Q. Ko\Y~ \vhen you pulled out around this 
trailer you say you could see down the highway 
for approximately 200 yards o? 
.. A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. You had your eyes down that highway, 
did you not·~ 
~~. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were there any cars coming towards 
you on the east side of the highway7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you see any coming towards you on 
the \vest side of the highway~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you expect there would be any cars 
coming towards you on the east side of the high-
way~ 
A. N" o, sir." (R. 459). 
On further re-cross-examination \Vith respect to his 
chang·e in testhnony relative to distances from yards to 
feet, the 'vitness testified (R. 461-4) as follows: 
'' Q. Now, you say you wer,e mistaken in 
ans,vering my question \Vhen you were testifying 
about yards and now you want to correct that to 
feet; is that right~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. S.o that now the Mitchell truck, identified 
by position No. 4, was now just 100 feet away 
when you first saw it~ 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And it was straddle the center line! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And as you were attempting to pass this 
other car you were watching the whole road ahead, 
weren't you~ 
A. Y~es, sir. 
Q. And you could see 200 yards, could you 
not' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Or did you mean feet~ 
A. I meant yards on that. 
Q. You could see 200 yards~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And yet you didn't see the Mitchell car 
until it came within 100 feet~ 
A. 'That is right. 
Q. Why, on account of the dust~ 
A. Well, it was on the opposite side of the 
road. 
Q. I thought you said it was in the center 
of the road~ 
A. Yes, I wasn ''t loking for one there. I 
was looking more or less down the east side. 
Q. 'Veren't you looking in the center of the 
road~ 
A. ~es, sir. 
Q. Weren't you looking in the other spaees 
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... ~. I \Vasn 't looking for any on that side. 
Q. Did you think it was safe to pass thi~ 
car, if there n1ight be another car in front of it 
going in the same direction()? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. If there were a string of cars going in 
th·e san1e direction you could have passed in that 
dust storm? 
~~- No. 
Q. Then it was important for you to know 
whether the highway on the other side was clear 
or covered 'vith cars~ 
A. If they were going in the same direction~ 
Q. No matter \vhat direction they w·ere going 
in; wasn't it~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. If you were looking to see if there was 
another car, you would have to pass the one 
so you could see if there was, hy looking on :the 
other side of the road, wouldn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you say you were not looking at the 
other side of the road when you were passing; is 
that right~ 
A. No. 
Q. How do you account for the fact you 
didn't see the Mitchell car until it was 100 feet 
away~ 
A. I can't. 
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Q. It just came out of nowher·e' 
A. Y~es, sir. 
Q. And you were looking all the time and 
would have seen it, but it just came out of no-
where~ 
A. That is right. 
Q. You testified you may have told Sheriff 
Smith !that car was only 20 or 25 feet away when 
you first saw it' 
A. Yes. 
Q. "When you rnay have told him, that may 
have been the truth! 
A. It may have been. 
; 
Q. If it may have been true that the Mitchell 
car was only 20 or 25 feet away when you first 
saw it, why are you testifying here today that it 
was 100 feet away~ 
A. That is what I say, I don't remember 
what I told Sheriff Smith. 
Q. You said it may have been true? 
A. I said it may have been true. 
Q. Did you tell him it was 20 feet away? 
A.. I may have told him 20; I may have told 
him more. I can't remember. 
Q. And it may have be·en ~t:rrue fhat that is aU 
the farther ·aw1ay ,it w:as; isn't th1at correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Otherwise you would not have told him 
tha;t; isn't that correct~ 
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~-\.. Yes. 
Q. No,v, I \Yant you to tell m~e why here 
today before this jury under oath you are willing 
to testify it was 100 feet away when you. first saw 
"t' 1 . 
~:\... It Inay have been 100 feet. 
Q. There is a vast difference between 20 
and 100 feet~ 
.. ..-\... Yes, there is. 
Q. Or between 100 feet and 100 yards~ 
_._:\... Yes, sir. ( R. 464) . 
Q. How could it possibly have been 100 f~eet 
and also possibly 20 feet at the same time' 
A. It couldn't. 
Q. S.a yo~t don't know how far atoay it w:as, 
do you; is that right? 
A. That is right. 
Q. .A .. nd you are not goim.g to testify here 
today it was mo.r:e tharn 20 feet ~aw,a.y, are you? 
A. It could hav.e been. 
" Q. You are not g~oing to s~ay it was, are you? 
A. I couldn't b,e acctoriate .an it, n.o. (R. 465). 
It is significant that \Tan Patten did not observe, 
\Vhether or not the Pace car, \vith the boat trailer, which 
he \\Tas atten1pting to pass, did anything \Vith respect 
t ~) changing its course or slackening its speed, after Van 
Patten saw Mitchell's ca:r, a:s he -claims, in t~he center 
of the hig]nya~T (R. 468). 
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SOME OF THE SELF-CONTRADICTIONS 
OF VAN PATTEN 
1. That the point of impact was 10 or 15 
feet off the highway. (R. 429) ; That the point 
of impact was 15 feet east of the center line. (R. 
454-5). 
2. That his vehicle with traileT attached was 
about 60 feet 'long (R. 436-7), yet he left the high-
way at a 45-degree angle and arrived at the point 
of impact 15 feet east of the center line. (R. 455 ). 
3. That all of his vehicle was off the high-
way at the time of impact. (R. 430; R. 454). That 
all of his vehicle was not off the highway at the 
time of impact. (R. 456). 
4. That he could see 200 yards up the high-
'vay as he attempted to pass the Pace car and 
he 'vas watching both sides of the highway all 
the time. (R. 446). In his sworn deposition he 
stated he could see just 100 yards ahead. (R. 
442). That he ''Tasn't looking for a car on the 
opposite side of the road. (R. 462-463). That 
he was looking all the tin1e and would have seen 
the Mitchell car but it just came out of nowhere. 
(R. 463). 
5. That the 1iitchell car was 100 yards away 
straddle the center line when he first saw it. (R. 
447). That the Mitchell car was 100 feet .avvay 
and on the opposite side of the highway when he 
first saw it. (R. 462). That the Mitchell car was 
20 to 25 feet ahead of him when he first saw it. 
(R .. 463-4-5). That he doesn't know how far a\\ray 
it 'vas. (R. 465). 
6. That he had no idea how fast Mitchell 
"ras going. (R. 447). That he knows Mitchell 
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\vas Inoving n1ore than :J n1iles per hour. (R. 439). 
7. That ~fitchell was on the wrong side of 
the road and suddenly cut across in the path 
of 'Tan Patten's truck. (R. 447). That Mitchell 
"~as not to blame. ( R. 451). 
The defendants rlai1n that the self contradicted evi-
dence of 'Tan Patten was corroborated by the witness 
Pace. Pace testified that he \vas operating the car with 
boat trailer attached behind in a southerly direction on 
the high,vay, in the dust storm area; that he could see 
the center line sometimes and that he was as near the 
middle lane of his traffic as he could get ,R. 470-471). 
(R. 471). 
'' Q. And while you were so traveling were 
you aware of a truck behind you~ 
A. I was not. 
Q. When was the first time you saw the 
pick-up truck which was driven hy Mr. Mitchell, 
that was involved in the accident~ 
A. Well, it just s~eemed to come up out of 
nowhere. Visibility was bad, and it just came up 
all of a sudden. 
Q. Which direction was the truck travelingt 
A. It was trav~eling north. 
Q. In the opposite direction to which you 
'vere traveling~ 
A. Yes sir. 
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Q. And how far ahead of your car was that 
truck when you first saw it, that pick-up truckT 
A. I could only give the distance approx-
imately. It was a short distance, I would say 
anywhere from twenty-five to fifty yards, approx-
imately. 
Q. Wher~e was that truck with respect to the 
center line of the highway~ 
A. It was about in the center of the high-
\vay, probably straddle of the center of the yellow 
line in the highway, when I saw it. 
Q. And you were about twenty-five to fifty 
yards from that truck at that time~ 
A. Approximately, yes. 
Q. Had you seen that pick-up truck prior 
to that tim·e ~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. On which side of you did the pick-up 
truck pass~ 
A. It passed on the east side, in his own 
lane of traffic. 
Q. And did you see the collision betwe~en 
that truck and the Arrovvhead truck~ 
A. I didn't actually see the collision. They 
hit just back of me. I heard the crash, but I 
didn't actually see them hit." (R. 472). 
On cross-examination, the 'vitness described the dust 
storm as very dense. He stated that there vvere breaks in 
the dust storm that would ·permit one to see the pave-
lnent in head of the car. Then it would fill in, and you 
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couldn •t st>e the pave1nent any"~here. So1netiu1es the 
vi~ibility \Yould be reduced ahnost to the point irnmedi-
ately in front of the car. \Y" e quot~e directly from the 
witness Pace's testin1ony, at the top· of page 476 in the 
record: 
· · Q. In other 'vords, those gusts of wind 
'vere bringing dust thickly across the highway 
practically all the time, and there were some 
breaks, but they were more or less just momentary 
breaks, weren't they~ 
.... cl. Ther,e "\Vere breaks for a little time, and 
it closed in.'' 
Then again comn1encing at page 477, the witness tes-
tified as follows: 
"Q. Were you aware, at the tim·e the :truck 
attempted to pass you~ 
_._~. No sir. I never knew it was trying to 
pass at all. 
Q. Were you required to alter the course of 
your automobil·e by the approach of Mr. Mitchell's 
car~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. You were able to continue straight on 
the way you were going~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Undisturbed~ 
A. Yes- sir. 
Q. So, if he may have momentarily traveled 
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on the center line ·it wasn't suffici~ently far to 
interfer;e with the movement of your car in the 
opposite direction~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. Now, it is possible that he may not have 
been straddle of the eenter line, is it not, Mr. 
Pace~ ... 
A. As near as I could tell, he was straddle 
of the center line. 
Q. Could you s~ay about how· much of his 
vehicle w1as on the W'est side ·Of the center lime1 
A. No sir. 
Q. Would you say he w~as st'naddle, his ve-
hiC'le w'as as much ~as a -"o,ot to the west of the 
center litne1 
A. I wouldA'tft';t .at.t~e:mpt t1o s~ay. 
Q. As a matter of f'aet, he may have been 
right nerar the center lifne:? 
A. As near as I could t·ell, he w'as riditng 
very near the center line. 
Q. Did you observe what distance he was 
trav·eling in that position?· 
A. No sir, when I seen the truck, this pick-
up, it just come up out of nowheres. He just 
n1ade a slight turn into his line of traffic, anq 
passed me in the -clear. 
Q. About how far ahead of you was the 
pick-up when you first observed it~ 
A. I stated, as near as my judgment, it was 
a short distance. I would say between twenty-five 
and fifty yards. A short distance." (R. 478). 
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The \Yitness testified that ther;e wa;s no curve in .the 
road, that the high,vay \Yas a stra.ight-of-\vay, and that 
plaintiff"s truck can1~e suddenly ou.t of the dust storm at 
a distance of about twenty-five to fifty yards (R. 479). 
The \Yitness Pace could not say how Inuch of plain-
tiff'~ vehicle \\?as ·w·est of the center line, nor would he 
atten1pt to say that it was even as 1nuch as a foot to the 
\Yest of the center line. The \Yitness finally admitted t'ha1t 
as near as he could tell plaintiff was riding very near 
the center line. This certainly does not constitute sub-
stantial evidence that plaintiff \Vas on the wrong side of 
the road, if the witness would not say that he overlapped 
it so 1nuch as a foot. _A_t most it constituted evidence that 
plaintiff \Yas very near the center line. What witness 
Pace, peering thru the dust storm interpreted a.s a 
""slight" swerving to the right of plaintiff's car, very 
likely was the act of the plain tiff as he started to pull 
off the highway and stop. 
On the other end of the dust storm, was the plaintiff, 
~\Iitchell, 'vho also entered the dust storm behind another 
car. He follo,ved that car for son1e distance but rather 
than atte1npting to pass as the defendants had done, the 
ear ahead of him, the plain tiff deen1ed it advisable to 
drop behind and pull over to the side of the road an~ 
~top for a couple of minutes to pern1it the car ahead to 
lllOYe on out of the way. Plaintiff testified that things 
then see1ued to clear slightly and he proceeded back onto 
the high,vay in lo\v gear at a ve:.;y lo'v rate of speed,-
not 1nueh oYer five n1iles per hour. -'Fisibilit~: "\vas Yery 
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limited-fro1n 25 to 40 feet. Plaintiff was very particular 
that he knew "\vhere he was located on the highway (R. 
236). A little \Vays down the highway, that would be 
south, plaintiff 1net a car with its lights on, and in that 
dust there was quite a glo\v and it disturbed him a little. 
He said: ''I am going to pull off the highway and stop 
until this thing clears up a little." Immediately after 
he passed that car, he began to do just that thing, sort of 
pulling to the right vv-ith the idea of stopping, and getting 
off the highway (R. 237). 1\Iitchell testified that very 
definitely that he was off the paved portion when he was 
struck by the defendant's truck, and that at that time he 
vvas stopping, his intentions wer;e to stop, and he was 
either stopped, or moving very slightly, very slowly. 
That the defendant's truck could not have been over 25 
feet when he first saw it. That the limit of visibility 
was about 25 feet. (R. 238) When asked what steps he 
took to avoid colliding with the truck when it first came 
into view, Mitchell testified that there was not much he 
could do being practically stopped but that he naturally 
pulled hard to his right. ( R.. 239) . 
It is quite clear from the testimony that the car 
w·hich 1\fitchell sa"\v coming toward him ahead of the de-
fendant's truck, was undoubtedly the Pace car, for it 
had passed immediately prior to the collision. Pace 
testified 'that he saw the plaintiffs truck swerve slightly 
into plaintiff's lane of traffic, and that plaintiff passed 
hL."'1l in the rear. (R. 478) Pace did not see the collision 
but heard the ·c.rash. They hit just hack of him. (R. 472) 
1~,rom all the testimony, Pace was ahead of 'lan Patten 
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J.Iitchell's e.ar, assuming against· the evidence that it ma.y 
ha.Ye been 1non1entarily astraddle the center line. Pace 
in advance of the \'"an Patten car, was not required to 
alter the course of his vehicle to avoid colliding with 
J.Iitchell and proceeded along undisturbed, from which 
the jury \Yere com·p~elled to conclude, that if Van Patten 
had been in his proper lane of traffic, he would not have 
been confronted with any emergency. Van Patten can-
not reasonably seek to be relieved of the consequences of 
an em~rgency situation which was created entirely 
through his '0\vn folly. Th·ere -could he no possible causal 
connection between any negligent act of Mitchell's and 
the collision vYhich resulted from the presence of the 
.A._rrowhead truck on Mitchell's side of the road. 
:J.[itchell continued to the right of the center line, 
\Veil over the shoulder of the road on his right, right up 
to the time he started pulling off the highway, just prior 
to the accident. The left wheels were still on the asphalt 
and his right wheels were on the shoulder. (R. 337 -338) 
There was one car with lights on going south, that he met 
a short distance ahead of the truck. The meeting of that 
car made him determine to pull off the road. and wait 
for the dust to clear. Then just ahead of the truck \Vas 
another car traveling in the same direction as the truck. 
(R. 338-339) The truck was very close to the other car. 
The other car was coming past him when the truck ap-
peared back of it on plaintiff's side of the road, when he 
first sa\v the truck. (R. 340) Plaintiff denied that he was 
straddle the center line when the car passed immediately 
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in front of the truck, but it is certain that he was well 
east of the center line. 
Joan Mitchell testified that she was plaintiff's dau-
ghter, age 16, and was a passenger in the truck her father 
was driving. That as they entered the dust storm, they 
were follo'\\-ing another car, and her father stopped for 
a coup1e of minutes to let the car go ahead. And then 
started forward in low gear, from which gear, he did 
not shift at all. She was watching the center line most 
of the time. (R. 360-361) The dust storm was awfully 
thick and you couldn't see much more than about 20 or 
25 feet ahead. Plaintiff did not at any time drive his 
truck on the left side of the center line. They were just 
pulling off the highway on their side, when the truck 
came into view (R. 362). They had practically stopped 
and were going about 3 or 4 miles per hour, when the 
Arrowhead truck came into view. (R. 363) 
\Vith respect to her position in the seat, Joan testi-
fied th!at her father did not hit her in driving t!he truck. 
(R. 367) She recalled that the car passed just in front 
of the Arrowhead truck (R. 3·68). 
Sheriff Kent G. Smith testified that he investigated 
the accident. (R. 384) He stated that Exhibits T, and U, 
and V, represented the appearance of the trucks involved 
in the collision. (R .. 385). That the highway is 19¥2 feet 
wide wher.e the accident occurred and is a two-lane high-
way with a yellow line separating the traffic lanes. (R. 
386) He observed quite a bit of debris along the east side 
of the paved portion of the highway . There was a track 
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indicating \Yhere the pick-up truck had begun to be 
pushed by the other truck located on the edge of the 
shoulder. The shoulder was about 3 feet wide. (R. 387) 
The pick-up truck 'vas pushed approxi1nately 14 feet by 
the other truck. (R. 388). The defendants' truck had 
covered a distance of 30 feet fro1n what ap'peared to be 
the point of in1pact before coming to rest. ·The debris he 
saw at the supposed point of impact con~sisted of glass 
and pieces of chrome and the ordinary things you would 
see at an accident. (R. 395) Van Patten told the Sheriff 
that he first noticed danger of collision when the distance 
bet,veen the two trucks on the highway was between 20 
to 25 feet. (R. 502). 
William ~1:. l\iitchell testified that he was father of 
the plaintiff, and a passenger in the pick-up; truck· at the 
time of the accident. He was s·eated on the right hand side 
of the truck. (R. 396) He kept his eye on the shoulder 
of the road as they proceeded in the dust in order to see 
if they were in the road. The truck was right on the edge 
of the road. He did not obse:rve the truck he was in go 
\vest of the center line at any time. (R. 398) He saw the 
Arrowhead truck before the collision occurred. It was 
maybe 30 or 40 feet away . Plaintiff's truck 'vas just 
about stop·ped when he first saw the Arrowhead truck. 
Plaintiff had turned out to wait for the dust storm he 
supposed. They were just about off the paved portion 
of the highway. (R. 399-400) The driver of the Arrow-
head truck called upon the witness William ~I. Mitchell, 
at the hospital, and stated to the \vitness at the hospital, 
that he, 'Tan Patten, was totally and wholly responsible 
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for the accident. (R. 505) 
Dr. L. \T. Broadbent testified that he savv Van Patten 
on the second floor of the Iron County Hospital in the 
1norning a day or two after the accident. That Van Pat-
ten asked the doctor how the victims were and stated: 
''I am awfully upset, I have to go talk to these people. 
I have got to talk to them. It was entirely my fault.'' 
(R. 2·55) 
Lay Evidence showing perma;nent ilnjury to 
plaintiff. ~and rp1ermalnent impairment of his .e~arn­
ing capacity. 
The defendants' summary of the evidence, both lay 
and medical, as it pertained to the injuries suffered by 
the plaintiff and to the permanent impairment of his 
earning capaeity is unfair and incomplete. 
vVith respect to the per1na.nency of his injury and 
with respect to the permanent impairment of his earning 
capRcity, the pJaintiff, Mr. Mitchell, at piage 245 of the 
record, testified as folloV\rs: 
'' Q. Now did you state whether or not you 
·experience any pain or discomfort in the vicinity 
of your-the back of your neck~ 
A. Always from the beginning, that was 
the very painful part. 
Q. What eff·ect did that have upon your 
movement of your head~ 
A. Well, the movement has been quite re-
stricted ever since the accident. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
Q. Does that eondition persist to the present 
time! 
.. A_. Yes, not as inten8e as it was at the begin-
ning, though, and fe\v n1onths now, I have noticed 
no improven1ent. 
Q. The past fe,v n1onths there has been no 
improvement in the condition of your neck~ 
... -\.. I think that's right.'' 
_._.\gain at page 246 of the record: 
Q. ,-,{ell state \vether or not you suffer any 
pain or discomfort in the movement of your head 
at the present time~ 
A. I do; I can move my head to an extent, 
and beyond that, it is very painful, and, if I per-
sist, it just feels like I am in a blackout 
Q. How far can you move your head without 
pain; will you demonstrate to the jury~ 
A. I can move it th~t far (indicates). 
Q. Can you move it in either direction~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. _._-\.bout the saln·e extent~ 
A. I think so, maybe a little better to the 
left than I can to the right. 
Q. Will you demonstrate that again, so that 
I can have the record indicate about the extent 
to which you can 1nove your head without pain~ 
MR WHITE : May the r·ecord show that the 
center of the chin, on the n1ovement of the head 
to the right at the present time, is. a matter of 
about an inch and a half or two inches from the 
center line of the neck. 
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~fR CANNON: I am not the record stater 
of distances. 
MR WHITE: If you have any dispute, ex-
press it now, or would you like to state it differ-
ently, Mr. Cannon~ · 
MR. CANNON: Oh, I think we are willing to 
take your statement, Mr. White, as long as we 
don't get into any misunderstandings later about 
it. 
Q. Now, will you describe again the pain 
that you suffer when you move your head beyond 
that point~ 
A. Well, there is always pain in the back 
of n1y head, the bas·e of my head, and that pain, 
of course, goes up, it feels like it is right in the 
top of my head part of the time. If I try to turn 
my head, seems right here in the neck stops me. 
Its just-its quite painful and just makes me 
feel like I am going t:o go right off. 
Q. Now, are you able to drive your automo-
bile at the present time~ 
A. Yes, I can drive it under certain con-
ditions . 
. Q. What conditions do you refer to? 
A. Oh, I can drive the automobile pretty 
good shape, of-as long as I am going do,vn the 
highway, why everything is all right. 
Q. Well, are there any driving conditions 
that you can't do~ 
A. Well, it is extremely difficult for me 
to do any reversing; I can't see what is happ~en­
ing from the back. Backed into a ditch a few 
times. 
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Q. No,v, while we are on this, Mr. Mitchell, 
I understand that at the present time you are en-
gaged in farniing~ 
r\.. That's right. 
Q. ..._-\..re you restricted at all, in your physical 
activities 'vith reference to performing your far1n 
duties! 
.... -\... I a1n quite definitely restricted; there is 
a good many things I can't do on a farm. (R. 247) 
Q. 'Vill you state to what extent that you 
are so restricted; what are some of the things you 
cannot do~ 
A. vVell, when it comes to strenuous physi-
cal work, I don't do ·that well. I can drive my 
tractor, but it isn't very satisfactory to try to · 
plo'v a field, or anything of the kind, when you 
ean't 'vatch to see what is happening to the plow. 
It is just guesswork. Drilling grain, or something 
like that, I don't try to do. 
~IR. CANNON: What is that 0? 
A. Drilling grain, driving tractor, pulling 
the drill. 
Q. Now in connection with your farm oper-
ations. do you run any sheep or cattle~ 
.. A.. Yes. I have a few sheep and some cattle. 
Q. And, in connection with that typ~ of 
\vork, is it necessary for you to frequently ride 
horseback')? 
.. A.. Oh, yes. 
Q. N ovv, do you suffer any disability or dis-
coinfort when you are riding horseback~ 
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A. Well- (I~. 248) 
A. Yes, I suffer disc9mfort riding horses, 
and I let them walk around mostly, now. (R. 249) 
Q. \V ell, now, you describe to what extent 
you suffer inconvenience or discomfort when 
you are riding a horse' 
A. Well, anybody that has ridden a horse, 
of course knows that there is 1nore or less jarring 
up there, and that affects the head. That's all · 
there is to that. 
Q. Now, to what extent are you able to ride 
horses at all~ 
A. I can ride horses, trusty horses, all right, 
if I take it easy. 
Q. State is there any particular gait of the 
horse you can't ride without disco1nfort ~ 
A. \V ell, I don't usually get then1 off the 
walk. I presu1ne I could by taking the punish-
ment, that I don't try. 
Q. No,v, do you have any feeling of pain, 
or discon1fort when you attempt to lift any heavy 
object~ 
A. Well, very· difinitely. It bothers n1e in 
the back of the neck and head, it just seen1s to 
kind of pull. 
Q. Do you have any.-in connection \vith 
your ranching activities, do yon raise feed for 
your cattle~ 
A. That's right, that-
Q. Do yon have anY clisco1nfort 1n connPr-
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tion 'Yith the harvesting of your feed crops for 
the cattle? 
.. A... ''Tell, that, of course, al,vays involves 
lifting, and the ·pitching of hay, and things like 
that: those all-
.A ... No. 
Q. Are you able to pitch hay at the present 
tin1e, 'Yithout pain °? 
Q. N o,v, .3Ir. ~fitchell, do you suffer any dis-
eomfort at the present tim·e in any other area than 
in the back of your neck~ 
.. A.. Yes, in a good many areas. 
Q. Will you just state where you suffer dis-
comfort at the present time~ 
A. Well-
Q. Let's start from the top down. 
A. In the nose area, there seems to be some 
pressure here yet, which is annoying, affects my 
breathing to an extent; the ear feels-oh, like 
there is a string tied around the base of it, and 
it is quite tender, and, at the same time, it feels 
stiff to me, like might rub it off if you were not 
careful, and the jaw is ·extren1ely miserable. 
Q. Will you describe a little more, with a 
little more p·articularity, the misery you suffer in 
the use of your jaw~ 
A. That's pretty hard thing to describe, but 
in the region close to the one ear here, there's 
some pain. 
Q. May the record-
A. Always. 
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MR. WHITE : May the record show the wit-
ness has reference to the upper portion of the left 
jaw in the vicinity of the ear~ 
Q. Now, when do you suffer that ;pain~ Un-
der what conditions of the movement of your jaw 
does that give you pain' 
A. Well, there is an ugly sensation there 
practically all of the time ; lot in this area when 
I try to use the jaw in talking or eating, and feels 
lil\!e it''S just sort of artifici:al, and it's quite a diffi-
cult thing for me to use it. As you notice, I use 
it, but-
Q. I observe that you give some appearanoe 
of talking through your teeth, or with your mouth 
partly npen; how far can you-
MR. CANNON: Now. just a minute, we object 
to counsel's questions in that form, and suggest-
ing matters as to what he notices; seems to me-
MR WHITE: Haven't you observed that, Mr. 
Cannon~ 
MR. CANNON: I have observed-
Q. Ask you this, Mr. Mitchell, how far can 
you open your mouth at the present time without 
pain~ (R. 251) 
A. Well-
Q. You de1nonstrate it for the jury. 
A. I don't know how far. 
Q. How far can you open your mouth at all, 
either with or without pain~ 
A. Well, that is about it. I never be·en able 
to open it too wide. 
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(~. ,\:~ill you just de1nonstrate that again, 
then I can indicate it on the record. 
~IR. CANNON: ''' e will say for the purpose 
of the record that the witness didn't open his 
n1outh all the way. (R. 252) 
~lr. l\Iitchell gaYe further testimony touching upon 
per1nanaent injury and impairment of his earning capac-
ity eommencing at page 316 of the record: 
Q. N o,v, ~Ir. ~fitchell, you've testified form-
erly that you continued to suffer from stiffness 
of the neck and pain on motion of the head, and 
also some restrietion of motion in the use of your 
ja,v, and some pain in your jaw, is that correct . 
.. A_. That is correct. 
Q. Have you suffered from any other con-
tinuing conditions up to this time~ 
_.r\.. Well, yes, my, my breathing is eonsider-
ably impaired. 
Q. Now. just describe how that's affected 
you. 
A. Well, there is, seems to be a little pres-
sure on n1y nose there as though it were being 
pressed down from above, of course. 
Q. Now, is your breathing impaired through 
your n1outh or through your nose~ 
A. Through the nose. 
Q. I see; no\Y. do you suffer from any other 
eonditions, in addition to that~ 
A. Well, I think perhaps you asked me about 
it here once. That's condition there that's quite 
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difficult; it's painful, 1niserable, feels like it is 
tied up, and it is annoying because of the aperture 
into the ear is small, considerably smaller than 
the other one. 
Q. Now. Mr. Mitchell, how is your condition 
A. Well, I have extreme difficulty getting 
any rest. I-when I get real tired, I can lie down 
with respect to your ability to sleep at night~ 
and sleep maybe an hour and a half and two hours, 
and then I sleep very little. I just cat nap after 
that. I haven't had a night's rest for a long time. 
Q. State whether or not that condition has 
con tinned since the date of the accident. 
A. That's entirely right. The condition, of 
course, I think was worse immediately after the 
accident, worse than it is now. I had difficulty 
sleeping at all lying down. I think I still can sleep 
better sitting up than lying do·wn. 
Q. Are there any positions that-that is, re-
clining positions that it is uncomfortable for you 
to sleep in or lie in~ 
A. Yes, definitely; on my back or my left 
side, not able to lie on my left side. 
Q. What is the experience you have when 
you attempt to lie on your left side. 
A. vV ell, there is considerable pain in the 
ear area, and I just don't try. 
Q. vVhat is your experience when you at-
tempt to lie on your back~ 
A. Well, this head situation seems to in-
creas:e; the pain in the head is increased; just 
can't do it and sleep. 
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Q. No,v, aside fron1 the pain in the head 
that you have described, which results from the 
moven1ent of your head, do you suffer any other 
headaches or things of that kind~ 
A. Well, there is a continual ache in the 
back across the base of my head. 
Q. How severe is that at the present time! 
.. :\... Well, it's present all the time. !There are 
some times, of course, when I get real interested 
in something else, that I am not entirely aware of 
it, but the moment I relax at all, I am always con-
cious of the pain in my head. 
Q. Is that pain more severe or less severe 
than it was soon after the accident, say~ 
..._~. It's less severe than it was right after. 
Q. I see; hllt at any rate it continues~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. Now, Mr. Mitchell, do you have any dif-
ficulty in eating your food? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Will you just describe to what ·extent you 
have difficulty and in eating particular types of 
food~ 
A. Well, I simply don't get my mouth open 
wide enough to eat some types of food. If I ever 
try to eat a sandwich, I nibble one part of it at a 
tim·e, and anything like steak, I don't try, usually. 
Q. Now, have you had any difficulty in the 
use of your hands since the accident~ 
A. Yes, considerable difficulty. They were 
quite useless at first, but they have improved 
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som-e; the left hand has made more improvement 
than the right. 
Q. What was the nature of the injury, if you 
know, that you suffered to your left hand~ 
A. \Veil, of course, I don't know, ·except 
that it was terribly swollen and sore, and later 
on an ex-ray indicated that the hand was broken 
in the area here on the back. 
Q. Do you know who took that particular 
x-ray~ 
A. Dr. Paul Richards of the Bingham Can-
y·on Clinic. 
Q. Was that the information he gave you~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. Now, with respect to your right hand, 
you sa:: you also suffered some pain in your right 
hand~ 
-'-~· It was swollen for a long time, and it has 
continued sorer than the other one; seems to have 
been sprained in this little finger area, and also 
on the bone continuing up from the little finger. 
Q. Does that discomfort continue up to the 
present time in your hands~ 
A. It does. 
Q. Is it severe or less severe than it was 
formerly~ 
A. It's less severe, very definitely. (R. 319) 
Mr. Mitchell testified that prior to the accident, his 
general health had al,vays been good. That for 24 years 
of teaching, except for one week when he had an appen-
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decton1y .. he had never n1i8Se(l a dny of srltool on aeeount 
of his health. (R. 323) 
,, .... ith referenc.e to his present inability to teach 
~chool, the plaintiff testified as follows: 
Q. '': ould you be able, from a ph y sic a l 
standpoint, to carry on your vocation as a school 
teacher or school superintendent at the present 
time? 
.. A_. I wouldn't want to try to continue my 
~chool vvork at the present time. 
Q. And \v·hy not~ 
A. I just simply f·eel like I couldn't handle 
it this year. 
Q. Why wouldn't you be able to handle it~ 
_.A_. Well, in the first place, I would simply 
give out. It tires 1ne terrible to sit here in the 
courtroom. I don't think I could do that, and 
· the neck and jaw handicap I think, would make 
it quite in1possible for me to do a reasonable good 
job in a school.'' (R. 331-332) 
On cross-examination, the plaintiff testified that al-
though his headaches had diminished quite considerably, 
they w.ere still with him. That they vvere quite 'Constant; 
that he gets to doing something sometime and becomes 
unC'onscious of the presence of 'the 'headache, hut the very 
Inoment he relaxes the least bit, he is always conscious 
that the headache is there. (R. 344) The witness further 
testified, on cross-examination, that he eould driv·e a trac-
tor and ride his horse on a walk but he could not sow his 
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crops. ( R. 353) 
JYir. ~Iitchell testified, that he had always· had in 
111ind that if the right kind of opportunity came to con-
tinue his s-chool work and managed the p~rop~erty at Paro-
wan. That he ~htad intended to come to Parowan, where his 
farn1 property vv~a.s, and ranch property, and to first 
of all get that in condition so that it 'vould oper-
ate properly, and then if conditions arose whereby he 
could continue his school work, he had always expected 
to do that. ( R. 359-360) 
MEDICAL EVIDENCE OF PERMANENT INJURY 
AND OF INJURY p·ERMANENTLY IMP AIRING 
PLAINTIFF'S EARNING CAPACITY. 
DOCTOR KENNE'TH LE~WIS DEDEKIND testi-
fied that he was a specialist in oral surgery, as a Dentist. 
Dr. Dedekind testified that the upper right lateral inci-
~or tooth had been fractured off and also. the upper right 
first bicuspid. That there was also a s·hadow app~earing 
on the films that indicated pos~sibly one of the· 1tie·eifu was 
knocked com_pletely out, \vhich vv-ould indicate a second 
bicusp~id. The x-ray fi!1mS: taken were rather limited in 
their scope. They did not show the entire jaw, but that 
portion of the jaw which supports the teeth. (R. 171-2) 
16 teeth are norn1ally present in the upper jaw. At the 
time of th x-1·ay, there vvere 12 teeth in place in the upper 
jaw. Of those 12 teeth there were possibly 9 that showed 
no evidence of any harm. (R. 172) A visual inspection of 
plaintiff's mouth disclosed that the particular teeth n1en-
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tioned before had been fraetured and broken off probably 
by son1e severe blo\v, and the Yisual ex~unination was con-
firined by the x-ray. It vvonld not have been useful or 
practicable to atte1npt to repair the teeth, other than by 
the removal of those that vvere re1naining, and the ug.e of 
a plate. There \Yonld have been no use in trying to sav·e 
him anything injasmuch as the only tee-th pT'actically 
that '\Vould have been left vvould be his upper back teeth, 
vvhich would not support a denture very vve1l from a 
1nechanical standpoint. And so it was decided in con-
junction with Dr. 1.;Varburton, who subsequently made 
~Ir. ~fitchell's denh1re, that it would probably be best 
to remove all remaining upper teeth and those two on 
the lovver ja "'" that \Vere affected as well, and make him 
a restoration. The doctor stated that the fact that the 
nerves had be-en exposed by virtue of the c.ro,vns having 
been sheared off, would cause the patient to suffer con-
siderable pain. On July 23, 1947, three of the teeth wer·e 
ren1oved, and on September 12, 1947, 11 more were re-
Inoved making a total of 14. (R. 174) That included all 
of the teeth in the upper jaw and tvvo teeth in the lower 
jaw (R .. 175) \'l e quote from Dr. Dedekind's testin1ony 
at the botton1 of page 185 and the top of page 186: 
Q. But so far as his use of the javvs were 
concerned, what would you say~ 
A. His ja\\T~ \Vere solid, and, if he \vas able 
to \V·ear a denture, of course, he would have the 
inconvenience of eating without his own teeth, 
but he \Vonld be able to take nourishment all right. 
Q. And talk all right, would he~ 
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A. Yes, he could talk. 
A. Let me say this, at the time thes-e x-rays 
were taken, I noticed quite a bit of limitation in 
the ability of Mr. Mitchell to open his mouth so 
that we could get the films in, and whethe,r that 
has improved sinee then or not, or since his den-
ture was made, I don't know." (R. 186') 
Again on p~age 187, Dr. Dedekin·d testifi·ed as fol-
lows: 
Q. Dr. Dedekind, you say that at the time 
you attempted to insert the paraphernalia for the 
x-ray pictures, you obs·erved some restriction in 
the mobility of 1\fr. ~{itchell's jaw~ 
A. I did. 
Q. It seemed to he difficult for him to open 
his mouth at that tin1e ~ 
A. That is correct. 
DR. L. V. BROADBENT testified that he vvas physi-
cian and surgeon practicing at Cedar City, Utah. (R. 189) 
That he is a partner in operating the Southern Utah 
Clinic (R. 190) That he first saw the plaintiff on April 
3, 1947, when he was brought to the hospital, where he 
had been admitted in a semi-conscious condition, suf-
fering from shock, and it \Vas apparent that he had some 
severe damage to his loweT jaw. (R. 191) He wasn't 
clear enough so that he could be questioned until the 
following morning. There \Vas apparently some cerebral 
or brain depression, lessening consciousness, from the 
doctor's observation. (R-. 192) He was suffering from a 
1noderate brain depression. There was some beginning 
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s"~elling over his eyes and about the pro1ninences of the 
cheeks~ and he had ntunerous cuts and lacerations of the 
face. (R. 1~)~1) 'The n1ost n1arked laceration was the re-
gion of the left ear, and that ear 'vas cut from below, 
that is a.t a point where attached on to the head and be-
hnY, up,Yards to above the canal cutting directly through 
the ear canal, leaving approxin1ately one-fifth of the 
tissue still attached to the skull, to the head. And there 
\\~as an area roughly triangular in shape behind the ear 
over what 've call the mastoid area or, bony prominence 
behind the ear, about an inch and a half in size from 
whieh ;the skin was ahnost en1tirely gone, with the ·excep-
tion of a small pedicle. (R. 194) Except for the upper 
one-fifth of the ear, it was completely detached from th~e 
head. (R. 195) The part of the ear that was detached 
from the head 'vould have necessarily severed some of 
those nerve connection and there \vould undoubtedly he 
some altered sensation there, unless the nerve was regen-
erated. Dr. Broadbent would exp·ect that injury to the 
nerves in the ear to be a permanent condition. (R. 196) 
The x-ray pictures disclosed three fractures of the 
ja\v. ( R. 199) There was a fracture on the left side 
just in front of the angle of the jaw. That was a com-
pound fracture. l\. compound fracture is a fracture in 
which either the skin or mucous membrane or lining 
of the mouth and jaws is broken and the bone protrudes 
through. In this case, it was compounded on the inside 
and not externally, that is, co1npounded on the inside 
of the n1outh. There was a ragged break of bone there. 
The fracture was described as comp1ounded, comminuted 
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because of the segmented little fragments in the bone. 
It was a seve-re fracture. There was a simple fracture 
of the Icnver jaw on the left side of the point of the chin. 
(R. 202) There was a compound fracture also on the 
right side of the lower jaw. It was a severe fracture. 
A double fracture of the jaw was naturally more serious 
than a single. (R. 203) During the 13 days that the 
Dr. Broadbent treated the plaintiff there was a great 
deal of swelling about his nose and over around his 
left eye, with a great deal of discoloration around the 
eye. The left eye was swollen almost completely shut. 
(R. 211) He had had some hemorrhage around the ·eye-
ball itself which would indicate a severe damage to 
the blood vessels due to an external force, an external 
violence. (R. 212) Clinically it was Dr. Broadbent's 
opinion and the opinion of his associates that the plain-
tiff had a skull fracture. The clinical symp'toms which 
\vere present, whieh indieated the possibility of skull 
fracture, consisted of the swelling about the nose, and 
the eyes, and the hemohrrage into ·the tissue about the 
eye. (R. 214) Dr. Broadbent was unable to demonstrate 
to his satisfaction any fracture of the cervical vertebrae, 
but the plaintiff complained of severe pain about the 
level of the fourth cervical vertebra and the witness was 
looking particularly for fracture in that area. (R. 217) 
\Vi tness was unable to diagnose a definite skull fracture 
fro1n the X-rays. The witness susp.ected a fracture of 
the cervical vertebrae by reason of the persistent pain 
of a definitely localized spot in the neck which did not 
in1prove. \Yith the passing of time (R. 225) We quote 
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fro1n page :2:10 of the record for son1e direct testhnony 
from Dr. Broadbent: 
'• Q. .:\.. further question in that connection, 
Dr. Broadbent: You said that there may have 
been injury to the ligrunents in the neck, which 
\vould create a result similar to a fracture of the 
bone: is that correct~ 
.... \_. Purely hypothetical. Yes, it could have 
happened. 
Q. Now, Doctor, there are times when the 
injuries to the liga1nents and the muscles in the 
soft tissue in the vicinity of the neck may persist 
indefinitely, and even for a longer period than 
the sympton1s fro1n bone fracture, is not that 
correct"? 
..._;\_. I an1 not prepared to say how long they 
could last. 
Q. But \vhat I an1 asking is this, Doctor. 
}[ay not the damage to the ligaments or muscles 
of the neck be even more severe and cause more 
limitation of n1otion and things of that chaarcter 
than an actual fracture of the bone~ 
A. It could be equal to. I don't feel, p'erson-
ally, that it should be excessive. It could he equal 
to. 
Q. And, as far as you kno\v, that condition 
n1ay or may not continue for an indefinite period 
of time after the injury, depending upon the 
severity of the injury~ 
A. It \Yould be indefinite period-definitely 
an indefinite period.'' 
DR. F. W. BUTLER testified that he was a physici!an 
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and surgeon practicing at Safford, Arizona. That in 
addition to his M.D. degree, he had had two refresher 
courses at the Mayo Clinic at R.ochester, and one Euro-
pean post-graduate clinical course in 1937. That he 
began his practice July 1, 1926, and had p·racticed con-
tinuously since that time. (R. 2·59) That hetween 5 and 
10 per cent of his practice is industrial work. That he 
has serv~ed as a referee on the industrial commission of 
Arizona, for two years. He has had numerous occasions 
to treat many types of bone injuries and cases involving 
surgery. Five per cent of his daily practice would be 
referable to accident industrial work. (R. 260) Dr. Butler 
saw and t:veated the plaintiff commencing April 22, 1947: 
(R. 2.61) 
'' Q. What did his condition appear to he, 
so far as you could observe at that time, when 
you first called upon him~ 
A. Well, he was obviously in a great deal of 
·pain. He had a fracture of the lower jaw, or 
mandible. The jaws were wired together at that 
time. He had a very deep cut in around his left 
ear, with numerous sutures in his ear that had· 
not been removed, and he had extensive multiple 
cuts involving the left ear and the left side of 
his neck. 
Q. Did you observe any other cuts on any 
other portion of his body at that time? 
A. He had other cuts, but I don't have a 
too descriptive location of them. His face was 
swollen; his left eye was swollen and discolored; 
his neck was stiff and painful upon attempting 
to move his head; he could not open his mouth 
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beca.use his teeth \Yere fastened together. 
Q. \V" ere the teeth fastened together by this 
\Yire arrangement for the jaw~ 
\ "'7" ' ~ 
... ~. leS. · 
Dr. Butler testified that the plaintiff's whole face 
and neck ".,.as s"\vollen rather extensively and that the soft 
tissue arolmd his left eye was swollen too. (R. 262) From 
~\.pril 22, until about May 9, Dr. Butler saw the plain-
tiff approximately every other day. The plaintiff came 
to his office on May 9, for x-ray study ·of his head and 
neck and ja-\v. The doctor took x-ray pictures on the 9th 
of ~lay, 1947, which were marked plaintiff's exhibits 
~!i_, B, and C. ( R. 263-264) Dr. Butler stated that he had 
O"\V~ed his own x-ray machine for 16 years and had in-
terpreted his own pictures to the satisfaction of the in-
dustrial commission for 16 years. He had daily occasion 
to interpret x-ray pictures in his practice of medicine 
and surgery, with an ·average irrterp•retation of not less 
than one dozen films a day probably. He testified that 
Exhibit A disclosed a fracture of the mandible in two 
different places, a comminuted fracture-that means a 
fracture that is through and a p·iece of bone broken off. 
(R. 267) The doctor testified that the plaintiff had a 
fracture of the upper jaw or the maxilla involving the 
dental processes in and around the first and second mo-
lars upper left with a comminuted fracture of the dental 
processes. (R. 268) We quote directly from the doctor's 
testimony commencing at the battom of page 268 of the 
record: 
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"Q. N O\V, doctor, I hand you Exhibit C, and 
I wiH ask you to show what Exhibit C represents. 
A. Exhibit C confir1ns the above statement 
relative to fracture of the lower jaw and of the 
upper JaW. 
Q. Let me ask you, Doctor, what view Ex-
hibit C represents. 
A. That is a lateral view of the face, neck 
and base of the skull. It confirms the above state-
n1ent and brings out other evidence that was not 
visible in the previous x-ray, that is a fracture 
in the body of the first cervical vertebra; a com-
minuted chip about one-fifth the size of the body 
of the first cervical vertebra. There is some evi-
dence of an injury to the orbit and involving the 
frontal sinuses; that is referable to the sockets of 
the eye. It is indicated to me that there has been 
a fracture of the front part of the skull involving 
the left orbit and extending up to the fronta1 
sinus, left side. There is some evidence of a 
change in the consistency of the tissue in and 
around involving the first and second cervical 
vertebra. 
Q. What does that change indicate, Doctor~ 
A. They indicate trauma, or bony changes 
as the result of trauma. 
Q. What do you mean by ''tranma')T 
A. Injury. 
Q. State whether or not that condition of 
fracture and the subsequent changes that you 
have just testified to would have any effect upon 
the movement of the neck~ 
A. \r ery definite limited motion. 
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Q. State ho'v that occurs. 
~\. Bec-ause the first t\vo vertebra of the neck 
support the atlas and axis. It is just like a pool 
ball \Yith a hole in it sitting on an axis or a pin 
that rotates back and forth. 
Q. In connection 'vith the condition of Mr. 
~Iitchell·s neck at that ti1ne in the vicinity of the 
first cervical vertebra, did you make any external 
obserYation of the patient aside from the x-ray 
pictures' 
~l. He had pain on deep pressure in and 
around his neck. He complained of some pain 
in his upper extremities. 
Q. Did you apply pressure to the neck in 
the ''icinity of the first cervical vertebra at that 
time~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, Doctor, I will ask you, in view of 
your experience in the diagnosis and treatment 
of conditions of this type, if you have an opinion 
as to the length of time which would be required 
for the patient to recover from an injury to the 
neck as indicated by the x-ray pictures and by 
your observations at that time~ You may indi-
cate "yes" or "no" if you have such an opinion. 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is that opinion~ 
A. My opinion is that an injury of the neck 
of this nature naturally will result in S'ome dis-
ability. 
Q. What I mean, Doctor, is do you have an 
opinion as to \vhether such an injury \vill be per-
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n1anent or heal completely~ (R. 270) 
A. It will be of a permanent nature. (R. 271) 
Q. Doctor, do you have an opinion as to 
whether or not the patient's use of his neck, the 
movement of his head, will be restricted per-
manently~ 
A. Yes, I am sure there will be some limita-
tion of motion there. · 
Q. Have you as a physician and surgeon 
had occasion to treat injuries involving fracture 
of the cervical vertebra~ 
A. Yes, I have had several in my experience. 
Q. Now, Doctor, I will ask you whether in 
view of your experience you have an opinion as 
to whether or not an injury to the first cervical 
vertebra as shown by Exhibit C will be permanent 
or temporary~ 
A. There will be a certain per cent of per-
manent disability. 
Q. I will ask you again, Doctor, if you have 
an opinion as to whether or not the patient 'vill 
suffer a permanent restriction of the mo hili ty of 
the head and neck~ 
A. There will be a permanent limitation of 
the motion in all spheres. 
Q. What do you mean by ''all spheres''~ 
.. A.. Side, lateral, up, down, back-aU spheres 
of motion. 
Q. Doctor, do you have an opinion as to 
whether or not this process of calcification or de-
posit of hone in the vicinity of the first cervical 
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vertebra \vould continue into the future, or will 
ceaset 
...._.\_. \ ... es. 
Q. Doctor, what is that opinion~ 
~-\.. :JI y observation has been with similar 
cases that severe injury involving a joint. of a 
vertebra very frequently results in a condition 
called traumatic arthritis, or an arthritic ·condi-
tion of the intervertebral joint or articulation. 
(R. 272) 
Q. No,v, Doctor, do you have an opinion as 
to whether or not an injury to the neck of the 
type indicated by Plaintiff's Exhibit C would have 
a tendency to produce pain upon the movement of 
the head~ 
A. It would. 
Q. Now, Doctor, do you have an opinion as 
to whether or not injuries to the neck and jaw 
and orbit, as you have testified to with respect 
to these exhibits, could result from natural causes 
or would be due to a traumatic injury? 
A. It would of necessity be due to a severe 
injury or blow; it could not result from natural 
causes." (R. 273) 
We again quote Dr. Butler's testimony frorn page 
275 of the record: 
•'Q. Doctor, do you have an opinion as to 
whether or not the plaintiff has suffered a per-
manent partial loss of bodily function by reason 
of the injuries that he was suffering from at the 
time you examined and treated him~ 
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A. Yes. 
Q. What is that opinion~ 
A. The opinion is based on the severity and 
the degree of the injury, that there will be some 
permanent impairment of bodily functions, pro-
bably early fatigue; a tendency to"TNard traumatic 
neurosis and p·ossibly a tendency to develop post-
traumatic esthenia. That is on the basis of ob-
servation where the vital organs were injured, 
or severe head injuries or severe -crushing in-
juries of the chest were suffered. A ·big per cent 
of individuals that have experienced that type of 
injuries have more or less phlegmatic attitude 
toward attacking problems of any magnitude.'' 
. (R. 275) 
Dr. Butler further testified on page 282 of the ree-
ord as follows: 
"Q. None of ~fr. Mitchell's bones were 
broken in any joints, were they~ 
A. Yes, the cervical vertebra there involves 
the joint. The first cervical vertebra is fractured 
into the joint." (R. 282) 
Again from page 283 of the record: 
'' Q. There could not be any arthritis from 
any of the breaks that you saw, with the possible 
exception of the cervical vertebra~ 
A. Well, there is a possibility that he will 
develop arthritis in the articulation of the jaw 
on both sides." (R. 283) 
Counsel at page 17, of their brief, in reviewing Dr. 
Butler's testimony, call attention to Dr. Butler's state-
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lllPnt to the effect that the plaintiff had n1ade a wonder-
ful recovery. He would n·ot say a complete recovery but 
that he had Inade a remarkable comeback. Dr. Butler ex-
plained that the statement on re-direct ·examination as 
follo,vs: 
· · Q. Doctor, 'vhen you stated on cross-ex-
a.I11ination that the patient had made a remark-
able come-back but not a co1uplete recovery, what 
did you mean by that'? 
A. Well, I had still in my mind that the 
last time I SR\V him he had this limitation of n1o-
tion in his neck and he had pain in his jaw and 
quite a lot of nervousness.' (R. 287) 
Cotmsel either with a deliberate or in an inadvertent 
attempt to mislead the court, quoted the last portion of 
Dr. Butler's testimony as an indication of the way he 
su1umed up his testimony as a whole, rather than as-
an explanation of the statement he had made on cross-
examination with respect to the ·extent of recovery. (See 
defendant's brief, p. 17) 
DR. REED SMOOT CLEGG, testifying on behalf of 
plaintiff, stated that he 'vas a graduate of Northwestern 
University and was resident and surgical interne at Saint 
Luke's hospital in Chicago, the orthopedic section, 11ayo 
Clinic, Rochester, Minnesota, for three years, and in the 
.A_rmy for three and a half years. (R. 288) That while 
he "\vas in the arn1y, he was engaged in orthopedic sur-
gery, and that he has established a specialization in the 
field of orthopedic surgery, whirh special practice, he 
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has followed for 11 years. That he first examined the 
plaintiff on January 15, 1948. (R. 289) The doctor testi-
fied with respect to this first examination as follows: 
'' Q. Doctor, while the clerk is marking the 
x-rays, what did your examination, aside from the 
x-ray findings, disclose at that time? 
A. I found several things wrong; I will re-
fer to my notes, and-
Q. Are those notes which you made at that 
tin1e1 
A. Yes, sir, these are my office notes. No.1 
is a healed fracture of the left mandible; No. 2 
absence partial teeth; No. 3, healed scar of the 
left ear; No. 4, area of anesthesia about the left 
ear and left side of the chin. 
Q. What is meant by that term, Doctor? 
A. That's loss of sensation in that area. 
No. 5, healed rib fracture, seventh on the left 
side~ No. 6, anklyosis or limitation of motion, 
partial fibrous of the cervical spine or neck; No. 
7-
Q. Doctor, at that point, may I inquire as 
to what extent the anklyosis of the neck appeared 
to be a.t that time 1 
A. l\{odera.te limitation of motion in all di-
rections." (R. 290) 
Q. Now, you have testified that was in all 
directions, movement of the head in all directions 1 
A. There was some limitation of motion in 
all directions. 
Q. What other observations did you make, 
Doctor? 
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.. A.. X o. 7, has apparent healed fracture of 
the nasal bone, with deviation of nasal septum to 
the left. That is the nose bone. No.8, is ankylosis, 
partial fibrous slight of left thumb in the op-
·ponens direction; and, No. 9, is anklyosis partial 
fibrous temporal mandibular . 
. A.. Temporal mandibular. 
Q. ·\Vill you explain-
. ..\.. Or jaw joint. 
Q. You mean, then, which jaw, Doctor' 
~\. \V ell, we speak-there is only motion 
in the lower jaw. 
Q. I see; at that time, you then observed a 
restriction of motion in the lower jaw~ 
~-\. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you make any other observations, 
Doctor~ 
.A.. I believe that's all." (R. 291) 
'\rith respect to the x-rays taken by Dr. F. \V. Butler, 
of Safford, Arizona, Dr. Clegg testified as follows: (R. 
~DG) 
'' Q. Now, Doctor, I will show you Exhibit 
C in this case, which, under the testimony in this 
record, represents an x-ray picture taken on the 
9th ·day of May, 1947, by Dr. F. W. Butler in Saf-
ford, Arizona, and I will ask you if, calling your 
attention to the cervical vertebra indicated on this 
x-ray·, I "rill ask you if you observed any abnor-
Inalities on the x-ray~ 
A. I do. 
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Q. What abnormalities do you observe~ 
A. There is an area of roughness in front, 
or anterior to the first cervical vertebra. 
Q. Just what do you mean, Doctor, by that~ 
A. There is an abnormal bony prominence 
in this area. 
Q. Doctor, state whether or not there is any 
evidence of bone chip in that area. 
A. Yes, sir, this deformity may be the re-
sult of a chip fracture. (R. 297) 
Q. Now doctor, have you had occasion to 
examine Mr. Mitchell subsequent to this first 
examination~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When did you next examine him~ 
A. Well, last examination was the-I be-
lieve, it was the 20th of April, 1948. 
Q. And did you observe any changes in his 
condition at that time~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. What changes did you observe~ 
A. Well, there had been some improvement 
in the motion of the left hand-let's see-1 be-
lieve that is the only significant change. 
Q. So that, excep1t for that change, the p:res-
ent diagnosis-at any rate, the one you made on 
the 20th of April of this year-would be identical 
vvith the one made at your first examination~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, Doctor, assuming that the ·p·laintiff, 
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~Ir. r.Iitehell, \Yas injured, sustained these injuries 
to his neck and ja\\r on the first day-on the third 
day of ~-\.pril, .l~l-±7, and, in vie\Y of your exper-
ience as an orthopedic surgeon, and, in view of 
the inforn1ation you have at hand that you have 
testified to in court relative to your examination 
of :ilir. ~Iitchell, do you have an opinion as to 
\\~hether or not the ankylosis of the jaw, which 
you have testjfied to, \vill be permanent 1n any 
extent? (R. 297) 
Q. You have such an opinion~ 
~\.. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is that opinion~ 
.... \. I believe there will be some permanent 
limitation of the n1otion, or ankylosis. (R. 398) 
Q. N o,v, Doctor, relative to the condition 
'vhich you observed of Mr. ~1:itchell in connection 
with the ankylosis of the cervical vertebra and 
the restriction of the motion of his head, in view 
of the examination which you have made of Mr. 
:\Iitehell, and, in view of the x-ray finding indi-
cated by Exhibit C, and, in view of your ex-
perience as an orthopedic surgeon, do you have 
an opinion as to whether or not this ankylosis or 
restriction of motion in the neck will be a per-
manent condition, to any extent~ 
Q. You have such an opinion~ 
A. I do. 
Q. What is that opinion"? 
A. I would exp·ect there would be some limi-
tation of motion. 
Q. My question was, Doctor, whether or not 
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you would expect such limitation to be perman-
ent~ 
A. Yes, sir, I would. ( R. 299) 
Q. Doctor, I will show you an Exhibit G, 
which Dr. Broadbent has testified to was an x-ray 
picture taken by-under his sup·ervision-at the 
Iron County Hospital of Mr. Mitchell, either the. 
day. after, or period immediately following the 
injuries which Mr. Mitchell suffered to his jaw, 
and I will ask you if you observe any fractures 
indicated in the jaw on this picture~ 
A. I do. 
Q. Will you point those fractures out, and 
describe them, if you can~ 
A. This side of the jaw is labelled "L", 
probably referring to "left." There is a line 
of fracture with smaller pieces of bone knocked 
off in this area, which is a comminuted or multiple 
fracture of the jaw on the left side. 
Q. You :observe any other fractures. (R. 
300) 
On the right side, we have a similar type of 
fracture in the jaw, which is evident here. 
Q. When you say, ''similar type,'' you mean 
that also was a compound comminuted fracture, 
I take it~ 
A. It is a comminuted fracture. 
Q. I will ask you, Doctor, if Exhibit F dis-
closes any fractures of the jaw~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And where are those indicated t 
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i\.. Fracture line evident through here, and 
not Yery clear, probably in this area there. 
Q. I think you may take the stand. Now, 
Doctor, do ~rou have an opinion, in view of your 
training and experience, and, in vie'v of the facts 
disclosed by your examinations of Mr. Mitchell, 
as to whether or not this area of anesthesia in 
the vicinity of the lip ":ill be a permanent injury 
or not' 
Q. You have such an opinion Doctor~ ( R. 
301) 
_..-\_. I do. 
Q. What is your opinion~ 
~-\. I believe that it will be pennanent. 
Q. Now, D'Octor, in view of your experience 
as an orthopedic specialist, and, in view of the 
findings-x-ray and otherwise-you have made 
through the examinations of Mr. Mitchell, do you 
have an opinion as to whether this condition of 
anklyosis of the neck and the jaw would have a 
tendency to produce pain~ 
_._-\. I do. 
Q. What is that opinion o? 
A. It might. 
Q. Now, what do you mean by that, Doctor' 
A. In attempts to turn the neck more than 
the limiting tissues allow, there might be pain." 
(R. 302) 
Dr. Clegg then testified that there was a slight limi-
tation of 1notion due to some p~artial fibrous irregularity 
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in the left thumb. ( R. 305) On cross-examination, Dr. 
Clegg stated that he couldn't see any other fracture in 
the vertebra itself, except the chip fracture and that 
was indicated by Exhibit C, where there is an area of 
bony roughness with a line through it that may possibly 
be a chip fracture. He stated that a healed chip frac-
ture ordinarily would not result in any stiffness or limita-
tion of motion from the bony changes. (R. 306) Thf~ 
doctor then testified as follows, at the bottorn of page 
307: 
"Q. And how, Doctor, then, do you conclude 
that-how can you determine whether there is or 
is not anything wrong with the fibrous tissue in 
the neck~ 
A. The fact that there is limitation of mo-
tion in the neck infers that there is something 
wrong or pathological of the soft tissue, which 
includes the fibrous tissues about the neck. 
Q. But, you wou.ldn 't know, from your ex-
amination as to specifically, anything specific, 
which would be wrong in the neck~ 
A. Well, yes, I think you could say you 
could. 
Q. What would that he~ 
A. When there is limitation of motion, it 
is usually due to what we call contracture or scar-
ring of the soft tissues which prevents the mo-
tion. 
Q. But, just where and what tissue are 
damaged, you wouldn't know that~ 
A. That's right. 
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Q. And in basing any opinion as to what 
n1ight or n1ight not be damaged in there, you have 
to be governed pretty largely by what Mr. Mit-
chell tells you ho'v he feels and how he can turn 
his neck and so on 'f 
A. ...-\.s to the an1ount of pain, we depend on 
the patient's subjective statement. 
Q. Your opinion is pretty largely based 
upon subjective statements of the patient as to 
what he says is troubling him~ 
A. Only partially. 
Q. Partially~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What else could your opinion be based 
upon~ 
A. The fact that there is limitation of mo-
tion is an objective or definite finding. 
Q. How do you determine objectively, Doc-
tor, that there is limitation of motion~ 
A. We do the test which is to evaluate or 
show the amount of motion of the neck, and this 
showed limitation of motion. 
Q. How do you do that, or what do you do, 
if anything~ 
A. First, have the patient turn his head each 
way, and then forward and backward while we 
hold the soft tissues in our hands; then we active-
ly, or we passively rather, turn the head ourselves 
'vhile we feel the neck. 
Q. Can you ·determine, while you are doing 
that, whether the patient is moving the head to 
the full extent he can, or-
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A. I think so. 
Q. That is pretty largely subjective again, 
however, is it not~ 
A. Not necessarily. 
Q. And tissues and fibrous tissue in the 
neck, Doctor, tends to repair itself, does it not! 
A. There is general improvement, but there 
may be permanent limitation. 
Q. There may be? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Whether there is going to be permanent 
limitation is a particular case is a matter of specu-
lation, is it not, Doctor~ 
A. Yes, sir; yes, sir. 
Q. Just pure quesswork~ 
A. Well, we don't term it that." (R. 309) 
Q. Now, assuming that the injuries to the 
jaw are of the extent indicated by the x-ray which 
you examined, taken by Dr. Broadbent, and-
Q. -and, assuming that the patient, more 
than a year after 1the occurrence of th·e accident, 
still suffers from this ankylosis of the jaw that 
you had yourself observed, would you expect him 
to he among the group of those many people who 
made a full recovery from an injury of this kind' 
A. Answer is no, he would not be in the 
group that would make a full recovery. 
Q. Now, Doctor, assuming that Mr. Mitchell, 
more than a year after the injury occurred, con-
tinues to suffer from the limitation of motion in 
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the neck and the movement of the head that you 
have observed and tested at this time, the in-
jury having occurred on the third of April, 1947, 
\Vould you expect him to be in that group of peo-
ple \Yho would make a complete recovery from 
the injury to the soft tissues of the neck that you 
testified in your cross examination Y 
A. No. (R. 314) 
* :t: * * 
Q. Doctor, in response to counsel's question 
that your appraisal of the condition of Mr. Mit-
chell may be speculative, did you mean by that 
that it \vas pure guesswork, or whether or not 
your appraisal is based upon facts which you 
have observed~ 
.. A.. It is based on experience. 
Q. And by ''speculation,'' did you intend 
to convey the impression that it was pure guess-
work as to what the prognosis .would be~ 
A. I don't think it is guesswo;rk, no, sir." 
(R. 315) 
\Ve again quote the doctor's testimony fron1 page 
311 at the bottom : 
'' Q. And whether or not there be any-you 
couldn't state for any certainty as to whether or 
not-well, I believe you stated, Doctor, there 
might be some permanent loss of motion there, 
that there might be~ 
A. If I said, ''might,'' I should have said 
stronger; I don't think there is much que·stion 
about it, there will be some limitation; you can't 
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say a hundred per cent sure, but I don't think 
there is much question about it. 
Q. And the extent of that disability would 
be a matter of pure speeulation, however, 
wouldn't it~ 
A. Yes, there is always variations. 
Q. And sometimes with an injury of that 
kind, or usually, the patient is restored to the 
substantial use of his jaws, is he not, and mouth~ 
A. Sometin1es, yes. 
Q. For all practical purposes? 
A. I'd put it it's possibility, hut very re-
rnote in this case. 
Q. W ou1d it he your opinion, D'Octor, mHn 
of Mr. Mitchell's condition would be able to sing~ 
A. I don't know if he could sing before, or 
not. 
Q. \V ell, assun1ing that he could; assuming 
that he could. 
A. \V ell, I can't say if you need full range 
of his jaw to sing or not." (R. 312) 
Q. Dr. Clegg, you have testified that in many 
instances persons who suffer fractures to the jaw 
make a full and a complete recovery, is that cor-
rect' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, normally, what period of tin1e is 
required for that complete recovery to be indi-
cated~ 
A. The length of recovery period depends 
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on the extensiveness of the injury, the patient's 
general condition, the age, and other influencing 
factors. It is very variable. 
DR. \.\'ILS.ON~ the radiologist \vho testified on be-
half of the defendants and 'vho was unable to discover 
a fracture in the plaintiff~s cervical vertebrae, never-
theless admitted that there "\vas a possibility that there 
might be a fracture there (R. 492); and he further ad-
Initted that even radiologists or roentgenologists dis-
agree in the interpretation of x-ray films and that s.ome 
-will see fractures \Yhere others 'vill not see them, and 
that in his own experience he has had occasion where he 
has disagreed \vith other radiologists in the interpreta-
tion of x-ray pictures. (R. 493) 
DR. RICHARDS, \Vho testified on behalf of the de-
fendants admitted that there may be a permanent in-
jury in plaintiff's neck. (R. 525) He testified that th·e 
union of the ja\v was a poor union as disclosed by the 
x-rays he had taken July 1, 1947 after the "\vires had 
been removed from plaintiff's jaw. 
'' Q. vVill you state what fractures of the 
jaw are indicated and what the type of fracture, 
is that the x-ray pictures discloses~ 
A. It was merely a small linear fracture 
at that point. I think m·ost of you can see this 
small line through the right side of the jaw, and 
back in the back part of the jaw on the left side 
there is a complete fracture line which is rep·re-
sented by this dark line running through at this 
point. 
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Q. Wha,t do you mean by complete fracture~ 
A. Well, I mean it is complete in so far as 
the bones themselves, completely broken through 
and apparently somewhat separated. 
Q. Would you refer to that as a comminuted 
fracture? 
A. Yes. 
Q. State whether or not there has been a 
satisfactory union of the jaw at that point. 
A. Well, in this x-ray there is definitely not 
a satisfactory union, in my interpretation. 
Q. Your interpretation is that the union of 
the jaw at that point is a poor union? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And this x-ray was taken after the wires, 
of course, were removed from the jaw? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What date in July, doctor? 
A. The date there is just obscure. It was 
taken on the first day of July, 1947. (R. 527-8) 
The witness was then shown Plaintiff's Exhibit Z 
and testified with respect to that exhibit as follows, com-
mencing at page 528 of the record : 
'' Q. Will you state what deformities this 
exhibit shows with respect to the jaw? 
A. Well, this x-ray shows the san1e fracture 
through the left side of the jaw at the so-called 
angle, or at this point. This x-ray shows that 
there is some beginning union in the posterior 
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portion \Y hieh 'vould produce a reasonable stabil-
ity of the jaw. 
Q. But 'vhere the shado'v is it discloses a 
poor union 'f 
A. 1"9" es, sir. 
Dr. Richards diagnosed a fracture of the metacarpal 
bones of plaintiff's left hand (R. 531) Then with respect 
to the injury to plain tiff's nose, Dr. Richards testified 
as follo,vs, beginning on page 532: 
· ~ Q. N o,v, doctor, at that time you also made 
an examination of the plaintiff's nose, did you 
not~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you discover any abnormalities 
about his nose~ 
A. Yes, he had a fractured nose. 
Q. What was the extent of that fracture 
and the details with respect to it, doctor~ 
A. As I recall he had definite external evi-
dence of a fracture as well as internal evidence 
of a fratcure, with somewhat of an encroachment 
of one of his nasal passages. 
Q. ~as it then what we call a deviation of 
the nasal septum~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that the cartilaginous structure in the 
nose, or bony structure~ 
A. The cartilage follows the bony structure. 
It may have a fracture of its own, but as a rule 
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it follows the bony structure which supports it. 
Q. Did you determine a fracture in the bony 
structure of the nose which resulted in external 
and internal deformity~ 
A. That was my opinion, yes. 
Q. You observed there was some intrusion 
into the nasal passage which would obstruct 
breathing to a certain extent~ 
A. Yes, sir; I have so stated, that there was 
obstruction, some obstruction.'' 
At the time of his examination of the plaintiff, Dr. 
Richards also observed that there was a point of an-
asthesia in the vicinity of the left lip and that plaintiff 
was in a highly nervous condition as a result of the in-
juries he had sustained (R. 534) 
DR. vV. LES WARBURTON, a dentist, testified on 
behalf of plaintiff that he examined plaintiff's mouth on 
J·uly 22 and referred him for some extractions. In de-
scribing the condition of plaintiff's mouth at that time 
the doctor testified as follows, beginning at page 370: 
A. Well, his mouth had pretty well healed 
from the injury at the time I saw him. There 
were still two broken roots imbedded in the mouth 
and which the crowns had been broken off, and 
one of them had almost completely healed over, 
but the mouth was, in general, was in the heal-
ing process, almost complete, and, at that time, 
we felt it was most urgent, in order to get his 
mouth healthy, to refer him for some immediate 
extractions, and, later on, come hack and have all 
the balance of the upper teeth e-xtracted, because 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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any restoration. 
Q. N o,v, \vhat nu1nber of teeth, if any, had 
the appearance of having been shattered in the 
upper ja \V J? 
-t\._. "\V .. ell, that is hard for me to remember 
right no,v. \\T e can refer to the x-rays and tell 
you 1nore definitely because that's the record of 
the mouth. I have got a cast here -of his front 
teeth; "\Ve could not get his mouth open wide 
enough to make a cast of his mouth at the time, 
and 'Ye couldn't make an impression of his mouth 
at any time until all the upper teeth were ex-
tracted except just the anterior teeth. 
Q. I hand you Exhibit D, which purports 
to be the x-ray pictures to whieh you have re-
ferred. 
A. And from these pictures, there wa.s one 
tooth that was completely knocked out of the 
mouth at the time of the accident; you can see it 
because the bone is so injured. 
Q. Which tooth was that~ 
A. That "\vould be the upper right second 
bicuspid. The first bicuspid, the whole crown is 
completely broken off, the root retained. The 
cuspid was splintered, and I have got a record of 
that tooth here on this cast where it was broken 
off and chipped there around the crown and in 
different directions; then-
Q. At this point, doctor, were those frac-
tures such as to expose the nerve~ 
A. Not on the cuspid, but on the other two 
teeth, on the lateral and the first bicuspid. 
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Q. In your experience, would that condition 
have a tendency to produce a great deal of pain 
until the situation was remedied~ 
A. Definitely, until you get denture relief. 
Q. Now, proceed, doctor. 
A. Right lateral, which is the one next to 
the cuspid, was completely broken off, and that 
is the one I saw was imbedded and healed over, 
and only by the·x-ray, we could see definitely there 
was a root, although I remember having suspi-
cions of being some infection or inflammation 
there. 
Q. Doctor, you have reference to this im-
bedding and of the roots remaining; is it neces-
sary in the p·roper treatment of the mouth to 
extract those roots~ 
A. Oh, definitely; all roots have to be re-
moved to make certain you remove infection. 
Q. Now, proceed, doctor. 
A. In that case, then-now, I can't remem-
ber how far the molars were involved in the bal-
ance of the mouth, I remember one tooth on the 
left side was splintered, but with the locking of 
the jaw, he had lack of opening, a semi-ankylosis 
there was at the time I was treating him, be im-
possible to get an impression to make a bridge; 
if there were any remaining teeth, it was only by 
removing enough teeth, we were able to make 
him a restoration to get into his mouth to make 
any impression.'' 
With respect to the injury to teeth in the lower jaw, 
Dr. Warburton testified as follows, on page 373: 
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...:\. The lo,ver right. We sent him home 
alhnYing that pa1·t of his n1outh to heal up. He was 
coming back for complete upper extractions and 
the removal of lower left second molar, which was 
badly splintered from the accident; that wa.s so 
splintered down the side of the tooth, and the 
'vhole buckle surface destroyed, that had to come 
out. That was right in line of the fracture of the 
jaw, too, so x-rays will show that was involved 
in the line of fracture, and was possibly retarding 
the healing of the fracture. 
Q. That particular fracture there would 
have a tendency to produce a great deal of pain 
until it 'vas corrected, wouldn't it, doctor~ 
·A. Oh, definitely, especially when the tooth 
is right in the line of fracture. 
Q. Then thereafter what treatment did you 
applyu? 
A. On Septen1ber 12, he had all the remain-
ing upper teeth out, and that low·er molar kept 
hun in town for a few days to check the prelimin-
ary healing, and sent him home, and I ·didn't see 
him again until Octover 7, and I proceeded to 
make him his first denture, which is more or less 
a temporary denture, in my estimation, and it was 
only at that time we were able to get an impres-
sion tray in his mouth to get an impression, and 
it was at that time I started my examination of 
the lower teeth, clean them out; we find out we 
have got another tooth on the lower that is badly 
splintered, the lower right cuspid. 
Q. That in addition to the one that is in 
the fracture area~ 
. A. Yes, lower right cuspid back of the 
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mouth that is badly splintered and will need re-
storing in sorne way. 
He then testified to the future treatment that would 
be necessary in order to repair the injured teeth in the 
lower jaw and in order to install another denture in the 
upper jaw. (R. 376-377) The doctor testified that the 
gums in the lower jaw were very healthy. (R. 378) Dr. 
Warburton agreed with Dr. Dedekind that there was 
pyorrhea on the right lower n1olar, but did not see how 
pyorrhea could be demonstrated on the left molar in 
the lower jaw because it was right in the line of frac-
ture. (R. 379) On cross examination Dr. Warburton 
testified as follows on page 382: 
'' Q. Now, let's-if you assume, doctor, that 
Mr. :Thlitchell had not been injured in an accident,. 
would you have any opinion as to whether, later 
on, during his lifetime, he would in all probability 
have to have substantial work done~ 
A. I couldn't make a complete examination 
of those upper teeth, and those are the teeth that 
are a loss. We can't prove anything on that 
question; go back to the lower teeth, if I can keep 
him as a patient, I would almost guarantee he 
could keep his lower teeth the rest of his life, 
remaining lower teeth. 
Q. After he expends this amount of money 
here that you mentioned, you would expect to put 
his mouth and teeth in pretty good condition~ 
A. P·retty good condition. 
Q. He would have the substantial use of his 
mouth~ 
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he can't open his 1nouth wide enough to really 
get "'"hat you call a substantial use because he 
can't take large 1nouthsful of anything. 
Then on redirect examination at page 383 the doc-
tor testified as follows: 
'· Q. Of course, doctor, whatever remedial 
steps are taken by way of substitution of a plate, 
they never are as satisfactory as the original 
teeth, are they)? 
... A.. \V-ell, never. They consider a denture is 
about twenty per cent efficient, as far as mastica-
tor~~ pressure, and people can learn to use those 
dentures and get by and do the job, but, if they 
haYe their o"'\vn natural teeth, they ought to be 
able to do about five times better. 
Dr. \~Varburton then testified on page 375, as follows: 
Q. Did the teeth, except for the shattered 
appearance, appear to be sound~ 
A--\. _Hardly kno'v how to answer that, be-
cause there \Vas so much displacement on some 
of the teeth there in his mouth, due to fracture 
that he had a misplacement, when he was through, 
the injured teeth were loosened and in changed 
and ne'v position; they would heal in that posi-
tion. I don't think I would say they were in a 
natural position~ any tooth in the upper jaw, al-
thought I won't say positively. 
Q. What I mean, did the teeth appear to 
haYe caries .or cavities, or other conditions which 
rendered them unsound except for the condition 
causecl h~' the injury~ 
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A. He had some restorative work in his 
upper teeth, but I would say they were sound with 
that. 
Q. Now, doctor, you say that you later, after 
the extractions had been completed, made an im-
pression for the purpose of making a complete 
upper plate~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And, thereafter, did you perform that 
work~ 
A. I inserted a full upper denture on Octo-
her 14. 
Q. Now, have you made an examination 
since to determine whether or not it will be neces-
sary to make any further alterations in that upper 
denture~ 
A. Well, that upper denture, in my estima-
tion, is a temporary denture. I would like to have 
him in and make a denture, now that his mouth is 
completely healed; we can't ever say a mouth is 
completely healed. 
Q. Why was it necessary to n1ake a tem-
porary denture~ 
A. Wouldn't want him to go six months 
without teeth. 
Q. So that denture which was made, you 
considered to be a tem·porary one~ 
A. Yes, I made it-well, on the basis that 
we would, after he got more of an opening, we 
could do a better job by getting in his mouth.and 
making proper impressions. 
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BRIEF OF ARGUMENT 
Point 1. The tria.Z oourt did not e.rr in 
adnl'itting i·n evidence the A·wnuif·y Table (Exhibit 
X) a.nd in i.ts inst~rnctions theteon. 
(a) TheTe zcas a.1nple er1"dence of perman-
ent inJury and of pernurne-nt in~pai.rment of e~arn­
ing capacity. 
(b) The annuity table W 1as iJn p1iOtper form .. 
(c) The co1.trf 's instructions on the A'Yiffi!Uity 
Table zcere in all .respects p·~o·per and if defend .... 
(lffl;ts desired ·amplificatlion ~of ~t·he couTt's charge, 
they should have requested it. 
Point 2. The court did not err in it's other 
instructi.ons to the jury, except t.o the p·rejwdice :af 
the pZainti_-f!. 
(a) Evidence of defen~a;nts' negli.genoe was 
clea-r, convimcing amd wncont'l1a~ic:tied. 
(b) There was no substantial evidence of 
contrib.uto.ry negligence which warranted submis-
sion of that defense t.o the jwry. 
(c) Assuming the suffici.ency of the evi-
dence of contributory negligence, the court never-
theless fully submitted ·and .over-emp·ha~ized such 
defense to the jury. 
Point 3. The defendJ(JJYbts did not p'11ovperly 
except to the instructions they now complain of 
and oarnnot urge such exceptions on a.pp1eal. 
Point 4. The court did not err in its fail-
ure to give defendants' ,requested instructions. 
Poilnt 5. The court dJid not err im denying 
defend{},tnts' mo1tion for ·a new tr~al. 
Point 1. The trial court ·did not err in .ad-
mitting in evidence the An711Uity Table (Exhibit 
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X) (]fltd vn its !instructions thereon. 
(a,) There w,a.s ample evidence of p~erman­
ent injury ·and. of permanent im.p~airm.evnt of earn-
ing oap~ac~ty. 
Defendants' exceptions to the use of the annuity 
table (Exhibit X) )s based upon their unwarranted as .. 
sumption that the plaintiff failed to show permanent 
injury impairing his earning· capacity. It is for this rea-
son that plaintiff has set out with admitted fullness the 
Inedical and lay testimony showing that defendants' 
position in that respect is not justified by the evidence. 
To sumn1arize briefly, the plaintiff at the time of 
the trial (more than a year after the accident) still com-
plained of a restriction in the movement of the neck in 
all spheres of motion; that he cou1d move it to the extent 
he demonstrated to the jury but beyond that it was very 
painful. It is o hvious that this injury would seriously 
ha1nper plaintiff in the performance of his work as a 
rancher, farmer, and teacher. He stated that there were 
a good many things he couldn't do on the farm. He 
couldn't do strenuous physical work well (and it cannot 
be denied that a farn1er's work is strenuous); that he 
'vas unable to pitch hay without pain; that he has a 
definite feeling of pain when he attempts to lift any 
heavy object; that he can't sow his crop·s; that he can''t 
plo'v a field satisfactorily, drill grain or things like that, 
because he can't watch to see what is happening; that 
in connection with his ranching activities it is necessary 
for hin1 to ride horseback, but he rides trusty horses 
usually at a walk, because of the pain caused by the 
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jarring; that he hns baeked his auton1obile into a ditch 
a fe\Y tiines because he had difficulty in reversing the 
car: that for the past fe,v months there has been no 
inlproYement in the condition of his neck. 
In addition to the neck condition with its continu-
Ing S)11lptonls, plaintiff testified that he was restricted 
in the n1oYe1uent of his jaw; that in the region of the 
upper ja"r close to his left ear there was always some 
pain; that there \vas an ugly sensation in the move·ment 
of the jaw so that \vhen he tries to us·e it in talking or 
eating, it feels sort of artificial and it's quite difficult 
for hin1 to use it. 
\\T e earnestly urge that the persisting restriction 
in the use of the ja'v adversely limits plaintiff's ability 
to perform his work as a teacher. How defendants find 
it possible to arrive at any other conclusion escap,es us. 
Defendants' position might he more tenable if plaintiff 
\vas a librarian with the duty of furnishing books to 
readers in silenee, but it goes without saying that un-
impaired speaking po\vers are essential to the school 
teacher. 
),foreover, plaintiff testified that he still has extreme 
difficulty in getting rest and that he can only sleep in 
certain positions; that his breathing through the nose 
gives him difficulty; that his head aches continually 
across the base of his l1ead; that he suffers considerable 
pain in the area of his injured ear; that his ear feels 
like it is tied up; that the discomfort which resulted 
from the spraining and fracturing of his hands still 
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continues. 
The permanency of plaintiff's injuries were con-
firmed by the m·edical testimony, particularly that of 
Dr. Butler and Dr. Clegg. 
Dr. Butler diagnose·d a skull fracture and a fracture 
on the body of the first cervical vertebr1ae and a change 
in the consistency of the tissue involving the first and 
second cervical vertebrae ; that such -condi'tions wouid 
very definitely limit motion of the neck because the first 
two vertebrae of the neck support the atlas and axis; that 
there were exte~rnal indications of p~ain on deep p~ressure 
in ·and around the neek. That the injury to th·e neck would 
naturally result in some disability which would be of 
permanent nature, and the patient's use of his neck and 
1novement of his head would be restricted permanently In 
all spheres of motion; that the process of calcification 
or deposit of bone in the vicinity of the first cervical 
vertebrae in similar cases of severe injury involving a 
joint of the vertebrae very frequently result in traumatic 
arthritis or an arthritic condi~tion of the intervertebral 
joint or articulation; that the injury to the neck would 
have a tendency to caus·e pain upon a movement of the 
head. That the condition of the neck would of necessity 
be due to a s·evere injury or blow and could not result 
from natural causes; that plaintiff has suffered a per-
Inanent partial loss of bodily fun-ction; that there will 
probably be early fatigue and a tendency toward trau-
matic neurosis- and possibly post traumatic esthenia. 
That the first cervical vertebra is fractured into the joint. 
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\\'"ith respeet to the ja\v injury, Dr. Butler testified that 
there \Vas a possibility that plaintiff would develop 
arthritis in the artieulation of the ja\v on both sides. 
Dr. Reed Clegg testified that his examination of the 
plaintiff on January 15, 1948, disclosed moderate limi-
tation of the motion of the head and neck in all directions, 
and further a fracture of the nose with deviation of 
the nasal septum 'to the left and ankylosis, partial 
fibrous slight of the left thwnb an,d l'astly ankylosis 
partial fibrous of the jaw joint or a restriction of motion 
in the lo,ver jaw. Dr. Clegg upon being shown exhibit 
· · C '' diagnosed an abnormal bony prominence in the 
area of the first cervical vertebrae which may he the 
result of a chip fracture. The only significant change 
'vhich Dr. Clegg observed on the second examination of 
plaintiff was some imp,rovement in the motion of the 
left hand. Otherwise, plaintiff's condition remained the 
same. Dr. Clegg testified that there would be some per-
manent limitation of motion of plaintiff's jaw and neck. 
Dr. Clegg 'vas able to determine by the movement of 
the patient's head with his hands that there was limita-
tion of motion; that there were indications of something 
wrong with the soft tissues including the fibrous tissues 
about the neck; that condition usually is due to con-
tracture or scarring of the soft tissues which prevents 
n1otion; that he could not say 100% sure, but he did 
not think that there was much question but what there 
would be some permanent loss of motion in plaintiff's 
neck. 
Both of the dentists who treated plaintiff· observed 
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a restriction in the plaintiff's ability to open his mouth. 
Dr. Warburton testified that this was of sufficient ex-
tent to make it impossible for him to take an impression 
of plaintiff's mouth until all the upper teeth were ex-
tracted except the anterior teeth. (R. 372, 374) Dr. Dede-
kind experienc-ed difficulty in inserting the x-ray plat·es. 
(R. 186-7) Of course, both dentists established the neces-
sity of complete removal of all of plaintiff's upper teeth 
as a result of the accident, and Dr. Warburton indicated 
need for considerable further treatment including the 
preparation of a more permanent upper plate and the 
repair of teeth in the low·er jaw damaged by the acci-
dent. Dr. 'Varburton testified that artificial teeth are 
only one fifth as efficient for masticatory purposes as 
natural teeth. (R. 224) 
It is true that Dr. '~Tilson, the radiologist called on 
behalf of the defendants was unable to discover a frac-
tur,e in the plaintiff's neck, but he, nevertheless, admitted 
that there was a p·ossibility that a fracture might be 
there, and he further adrnitted that even radiologists 
disagree in the interp-retation of x-ray film and that some 
will see fractures where some will not see th·em and that 
has been true in his own experience. 
Dr. Richards testified to a poor bony union with 
respect to the compound fracture of the jav{ as indicated 
by x-ray taken July 1, 1947. He further testified that he 
had diagnosed a fracture of the bones of plaintiff's left 
hand and fracture of plaintiff's nose with encroachment 
of one of his na.sal passages. He further observed plain-
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tiff·s hig-hly nervous eondition as a result of the injuries 
he had sustained. 
Fro1n the foregoing 1nedical testiinony we deem the 
conclusion irresistible that plaintiff suffered permanent 
disabling injuries to his neck and javv which vvould of 
necessity impair his ability to earn his livelihood either 
as a teacher, rancher or farmer. 
Plaintiff \Vas 51 years of age (R. 316) and had 20 
and 20/100 years of life expectancy. (Exhibit X) That 
his previous year's income from the school district as 
p1·incipal in 1924 was approximately $5100.00. (R. 329) 
and for the year prior it was slightly less than $4800.00 
( R. 330) and his salary in 1942 vvas around $3500.00. 
(R. 331) 
\Vhen asked why he would not be able to handle his 
~chool work at the present time _ the plaintiff stated: 
• 'Answer : Well, in the first place, I would 
simply give out. It tires me terribly to sit here in 
the court room. I do not think I would do that, 
and the neck and javv handicap I think would make 
it quite imp·ossihle for me to do a reasonably good 
job in the school." 
.... \lthough plaintiff had terminated his connections 
\Vith the schools in Arizona, he stated that he intended to 
eon1e to Parowan vvhere his farm and ranch property 
is and to get that into condition so that it would oper-
(~te properly, and then if conditions arose permitting he 
expected to continue his school work. (R. 360) 
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In describing his ranch and farm property, the plain-
tiff stated that he had about 98 acres of land which he 
irrigated, that he had pastures in the valley and pri-
vately owned winter grazing in the north end of the 
valley and approximately 1400 acres of summer grazing 
1nountain land near Parowan, that in connection with 
those lands, he ran she-ep and cattle. (R. 333) 
\Ve submit that plaintiff's evidence is altogether suf-
ficient to place this case squarely under the rule estab-
lished by this court in the case of Pauley v. McCarthy, 
109 Utah 431, 184 Pac. 2d. 123, wherein the court made 
the follovving declaration: 
"We wish to make it clear that we do not 
hold that in every case where permanent in-
juries are alleged and evidence in support thereof 
is introduced that the mortality and annuity ta-
bles are admissible. We go only so far as to 
hold that where the injury alleged and proved is 
pern1anent and is of such a nature as to indicate 
a permanent m~terial impairment of a substantial 
nature in the earning capacity of the plaintiff, the 
mortality and annuity tables are ··admissible.'' 
This rule was reasserted by this court in the .very 
recent case of George G. Schlatter vs. Wilson McCarthy, 
196 Pac. 2nd 968, fro1n 'vhich opinion we quote quite 
extensively as follows: 
''There can be no doubt in this case that 
plaintiff sustained very serious personal in-
juries, and that such injuries will to some extent 
be permanent in nature. The real question iR 
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'vhether the evidence adduced at. the trial would 
support a finding that the injuries were 'of such 
nature as to indicate a pern1anent n1aterial inl-
pairment of a substantial nature in the earning 
capacity of the plaintiff.' The question is not 
without difficulty. The medical testimony, stand-
ing alone, probably would not support the finding. 
But after a careful consideration of the entire 
record, we have reached the conclusion that a 
jury, from the medical testimony taken together 
'vith the other evidence in the case, and particu-
larly the testimony of p~laintiff, and viewing it 
in the light of their knowledge and experience in 
life, could justifiably have found that plaintiff 
suffered a permanent and substantial impairment 
of earning capacity. And since the evidence would 
authorize that finding, the trial court did not err 
in admitting exhibit D in evidence. 
"The accident occurred on October 9, 1945, 
and the trial of this action took p:lace some thir-
teen months later. 
"Plaintiff's right leg was fractured in two 
places between the knee and the ankle. For about 
the first seven months after the injury plaintiff 
was treated hy doctors retained by defendants 
and during this period little progress was made 
in the healing ·of the injury. Thereafter, plaintiff 
was treated by Dr. Clegg, an orthopedist of his 
own cho9sing. 
"Dr. Clegg testified that when plaintiff came 
to him the upper fracture had healed with a bony 
union, but with mal-alignment; the lower fracture 
showed no evidence of bony union and osteomyeli-
tis and pus drainage were present in that are·a. 
An operation was performed in which the infec-
tion was cleaned out and the bones were prop-
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erly aligned and set in position. At the time of 
trial the osteomyelitis was quiescent, and appar-
ently healed, but bony union was incomplete. The 
· doctor planned to graft bone chips from plain-
tiff's pelvic region across the fracture site. Phy-
siotherapy treatments would also be required. 
''The doctor anticipated that the proposed 
operation would be successful, but even if the 
best possible results were achieved, plaintiff 
would have ~at least a ten per cent permanent dis--
ability to his right leg, including muscle weakness, 
limitation of movements of the joints in the right 
knee and ankle, and poor postural balance. Plain-
tiff would not be able to return to work as a loco-
motive engineer until about two and a half years 
after trial, or three and a half years after the 
accident. There was a possibility that recovery 
might be delayed and he substantially less com-
plete if the osteomyelitis recurred, or if there was 
other infection·. And because of plaintiff's age, 
recovery might he slow and less complete than 
. the· doctor hoped. 
' ' The doctor vvas fan1iliar only in a general 
way with the duties of a locomotive engineer, but 
assuming a successful rec:overy, he anticipated 
respondent would be able to handle moderate 
work, to walk reasonable distances up to two-
thirqs of a mil-e, to walk up and down stairs, and 
if he exercis-ed care, t:o perform the various duties 
of an engineer suggested to him by counsel. .. 
"The evidence of plaintiff's ten per cent per-
manent disability to his left leg, when taken to-
gether with the fact that plaintiff would be nearly 
· 65 years of age before he would be able to return 
to work, and the generally recognized reluctance 
of employers· and especially ·railroads to engage 
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the 8erYices of Inen of advanced years, particu-
larly "rhen physically handicapped, would justify 
a jury in finding that plaintiff might never again 
be gainfully employed as an engineer or in rail-
road "'ork for 'Yhich he was trained. It should be 
noted here that plaintiff 'vas not trained or quali-
fied to engage in any other gainful occupation . 
.... \.nd even if plaintiff were able to return to rail-
road work, it is fairly inferable that he would not 
be able to work so many hours as before, due to 
his weakened condition. It is also inferable that 
even if plaintiff would be able to return to his 
railroad work, that he would not be able to con-
tinue in employment for as many years as if he 
had not been injured. 
''Although the evidence is not as clear and 
satisfactory as it might be, we think it is sufficient 
to support a finding of p·ermanent impairment of 
earning capacity. It was, therefore, in error to 
admit in evidence plaintiff's exhibit D, the com-
bined tables.'' 
See also Lovins vs. City of St. Louis (Mo.), 90 So. 
vV. 2nd 430. Borland VS. :racific ~leat and Packing Com-
pany, C\Vashington) 279 Pac. 94. The Washington case 
applies the rule that the annuity tables are admissible 
under the same rules and limitations as mortality tables. 
See also Gotsch vs. Market Street Railvvay, (Calif.) 265 
Pac. 268. Groat vs. Wa~kup Dr~ayage, et nl (California) 
58 Pac. 2d. 200. Woodward vs. Wilbur, (R. I.) 169 Atl. 
486. Penley vs. Teague & Harlow Company (:~1aine) 
140 Atl. 37 4. 
B. The Annuity ~able W.as in Prnop·er Form. 
The form of annuity tables received in evidence as 
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plaintiff's exihibt X was in all respects proper and the 
annuity table was fully explained by the witness, Mr. 
Wood, the certified public accountant who prep,ared it. 
Mr. Wood explained how the life expectancy was arrived 
at. (R. 406) He explained the computation of the Exhibit 
X (R. 411-412) On cross examination the defens-e coun-
sel developed testimony qualifying the mortality and an-
nuity tables. 
The tables were supplemented by ·expert testimony 
on the part of the witness Myrick, who testified with 
respect to the interest rates available to investors with-
out special skill and training in finan·cial matters that 
might he expected on reasonably safe investments. (R. 
414-420) 
Counsel points out at page 37 of their brief that 
the total verdict was $21,594.22 and they assum·e that 
in arriving at such verdict the jury arbitrarily selected 
the figure $16,591.71 from the 4% column in the 5th 
line of Exhibit X providing for $100.00 per month for 
the full life exp~ectancy. Of course, ·defendants rely upon 
the affidavits of the jurors for their breakdown of the 
items constituting the general v-erdict. This court has 
repeatedly held that the affidavits of the jury are not 
available for that purpose. But in any event the defend-
ants can not complain that the jury used the annuity 
tables as it did in arriving at its verdict. Indeed, that is 
·precisely the reason for the introduction of the exhibit in-
to evidence. As was pointed ou't in the case· of Schlatter 
vs. 'Vilson _~fcCarthy, supra., the· annuity tables: 
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'' \Yhen properly used by the jury n1ay be of 
greal value in assisting the ju·ry for fixing the 
dan1ages for loss of income. The calculation of 
the present value ·of the monthly inco1ne over a 
period of a life expectaney is no simple mathema-
tieal problem. "\Ve are not aware of any device 
other than these tables which \vill accurately in-
fornl the jury as to the matters therein contained. 
The jury should not be deprived of the aid and 
a~sistance of these tables merely becau8e they are 
susceptible of n1is-use. '' 
In that case the general verdict was In the exact 
amount of $41,212.44 ''Thich corresponded to the figures 
on the table opposite the 1nonthly income of $300.00 
discounted at 21f2 o/c. The Exhibit X was in the same form 
as the exhibit approved in the Schlatter case. On peti-
tion for rehearing the court filed an opinion on October 
20, 1948, in the Schlatter case from which we quote as 
follows: 
''Appellant's petition for rehearing on the 
grounds that this court failed to decide the con-
tention principally advanced by appellant, that 
the verdict was contrary to law because the 
jury found that plaintiff was permanently and 
totally disabled. Appellants assert that since the 
general verdict was in the sun1 of $41,212.44, 
w·hich was the present value of $300.00 per 1nonth 
discounted at 21/2 % for plaintiff's full life ex-
pectancy of 13.47 years, that it must he regarded 
as an a'Yard for tot-al and permanent disability, 
and that such an a\vard is unsupported by the evi-
dence and contrary to the instructions of the 
court, and hence cannot l1e permitted to stand. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
88 
''Although we did not expressly treat this 
contention in our opinion, 've thought that it was 
implicit therein, that the proposition now relied 
upon by petitioners was not meritorious. Upon 
re-exarnining our opinion, we find that the impli-
cations are not as broad as we assumed them to 
he, and so that counsel and the bench and bar 
may be more fully apprised of our reasons for 
holding petitioner's position to be without merit, 
we set forth here the reasons for so ruling. 
''The fallacy of their argument is that peti-
tioners assume that the entire amount of the ver-
dict was for loss of earning capacity, and that the 
jury made no award for pain and suffering. There 
is no basis for such an assumption in view of the 
extensive and uncontradicted evidence as to the 
pai.n and suffering endured by plaintiff over a 
long period of time. We cannot know, and we 
are not at liberty to speculate as to what reason-
ing prompted the ·jury to use the base figure of 
$300.00 per month in determining what the award 
for general dan1ages should be. We most cer-
tainly cannot presume that the jury ignored com-
pletely the extensive evidence of pain and suffer-
ing, and that it n1ade an a'vard for loss in earning 
capacity far in excess of what the evidence showed 
the loss in earning capacity to be. We must pre-
sume, in the absence of any clear showing to the 
contrary, that the jury acted in accordance with 
its sworn duty, and that a substantial portion of 
the general verdict must be allocated to pain and 
suffering.'' 
For further answer to defendants' contention that 
the annuity tables 'vere improperly constituted, we de-
sire to quote from ~the federal ca~e of Southern Pacific 
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87: 
" " 0 bj ection is 1nade to the tes tiinony of an 
actuary who presented annuity tables for the as-
sistance of the jury. These were co1nputed for 
the expectancy of the plaintiff, and the figure 
$2,400 was used as a base. The table gave the 
present sum necessary to return $2,400 a year 
for the expectancy, at various percentages rang-
ing from two to eight per cent. After the jury 
found the annual imp1airment of earning power re-
sulting from the loss of the arm, and the rate of 
interest which collld reasonably he expected from 
safe investn1ents, a sin1ple computation applied to 
the table would bring them to a correct verdict. 
Con1plaint is made because $2,400 was used as a 
base figure, the contention being that the loss of 
the arm did not in1pair the earnings to that ex-
tent. Some figure had to be used; whether it was 
$100, or $1,000, or $10,000 does not affect the cor-
rectness of the table·. Whatever figure was used, 
the jury must first find the loss of earning power 
and then use the table. The same objection could 
be made to any tables of interest or annuity cal-
culations, unless perchance the base used by the 
table hap.pened to be the amount in suit. The 
size of the verdict indicates the jury was not 
misled. Figured on a four per cent return, which 
a jury might fairly find to be all that could rea-
sonably be expected from safe investments, the 
. verdict is based on a loss of earning power of 
about $1,500 a year. This assignm~ent is entirely 
without merit." 
C. The court's 1·rnstructions on the Annuity Table 
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were in all respects proper and if defendants desi:red 
a,mplifioation of the oou,rt's charge) they should have re-
qu·est,ed 'it. 
The defendants conrplain of the court's giving its 
instruction No. 22 in which the jury were told that the 
total loss of futur;e ea.rnings if any must be reduced or 
discounted on the basis of a fair rate of interest or re-
turn. If the eourt had failed to give such instruction, the 
defendants "\vould have some cause of complaint. It 
reprresented a proper charge and furnished the jury with 
the necessary guide for the computation of their verdict. 
The instruction would naturally have the eff·ect of re-
ducing rather than increasing the verdict. 
The defendants further complain that the court 
gave no qualifying instruetions to th·e jury relative to the 
use of plaintiff's life expectancy as indicated by the 
evidence. In its instruction No. 17 the court told· the 
jury that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the 
actual loss of past earnings, if any, and for any impair-
ment of earning capacity,.if any, which will diminish his 
capacity to earn money in the future, and considering 
that matter the jury may take into consideration the 
degree and character of the loss or imp~airment of earn-
ing capacity, if any, resulting from plaintiff's injuries 
and the length of time it would continue. Moreover in-
struction No. 22 im'pOS'es the qualification heretofore 
indicated again in instruction No. 22-A given at the re-
quest of the defendants and rep·resenting a restatement 
of their requested instruction No. 20, the court s-et forth 
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the c.onditions under \vhirh the plaintiff would be ·en-
titled to use the annuity tables. In that instruction the 
jury \Yere told that the annuity tables were no evidence 
or indication in or of then1selves that the plaintiff has 
sustained any permanent loss of earning capacity, nor 
are such tables evidence that plaintiff has sustained any 
particular a1nount of permanent loss to his earning capa-
city, nor is evidence that plaintiff Inay have sustained 
son1e permanent injury sufficient to prove that he has 
sustained any permanent partial impairment of a sub-
stantial nature to his earning capacity, and the jury 
were told that unless the plaintiff has proven by pre-
ponderance, or greater weight of the evidence, that 
plaintiff has sustained a permanent material impairment 
of a substantial nature to his earning capacity, then 
they \Yere instructed to entirely disregard the annuity 
tables. Furthermore, counsel went into the matter fully 
on cross-examination and placed before the jury, testi-
Inony to the effect that all people do not live to their 
full expectancy, but some die much earlier and that there 
is no guarantee that a person is going to have good 
health, and there is a possibility that he might meet with 
future accident. (R. 412) Counsel at th.e trial were ap-
parently satisfied with the state of the evidence with 
respect to the limitations to be placed on the annuity 
table, for they requested no instructions relating to 
the use of annuity tables exeept in their request No. 20 
\vhich \vas given in full in instruction No. 22-A. 
J t "\Vill be noted that the only request made by the 
defendants on the subject of the life expectancy and an-
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nui ty tables "\\7a.s their request No. 20 which was granted 
in toto. It is ele1nentary that a party may not complain 
of the failure of the court to amplify its charge when 
the complaining party n1ade no request at the trial for 
such amplification. In that connectiop. we c.all the court's 
attention to the case of James vs. Chicago, St. Paul, and 
~f & 0 Railroad Company, (Minn.) 16 N.W. 2d. 188 at 
page 192 from 'vhich we quote as follows: 
''There were some inaccuracies in the trial 
court's instructions of which defendant also com-
plains. These were not specifically called to the 
court's attention after the charge was given, 
and in our opinion could not have affected the 
result. They will therefore be disregarded. Merit 
v. Stuve, 815 Minn. 44, Northwest 2nd, 329. 
''In this category is an instruction by which 
the court told the jury: . . . Estimated future 
darnages .... you have to give its present value 
of the future earnings .... in other words money 
earned in the future would not be worth as much 
at the present tin1e, but that is a matter of in-
terest. 
''Counsel was apparently satisfied with the 
instruction as gi.ven, he asked no further elabora-
tion, and took no further exception. Defendant 
was therefore held to be in no position to com-
plain.'' 
To the sa1ne effect is the case of Ralph vs. 1\Iacniarr 
Stores, ( 1\{ontana) 62 I:>ac. 2d. 1285: 
~'The next question raised has to do with the 
adn1ission, over defendants' objection, of a mor-
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tality table to ~hO\\T the expectancy of plaintiff's 
life. In admitting it the court said: ·This is a 
matter that is generally taken up in connection 
with instructions.' The court also stated that 
"the preferred table is admitted in evidence, sub-
ject to instructions to be given to the jury, the 
expec.taney of life of a female of the age of 34 
years is 32.42 years.' Defendants now complain 
tha.t no instructions regarding this matter were 
later given to the jury. They contend that the 
court, after admitting the table in evidence, 
should have instructed the jury as to the appli-
cability of the annuity tables; and that where, 
as in this case, the evidence is conflicting as to 
whether the plaintiff's injuries are permanent the 
court should have instructed th·e jury that such 
tables were not to be used unless the injuries were 
found to be permanent, citing Cornell vs. Great 
Northern Ry. Co., 57 Mont. 177, 187 P. 902, and 
Robinson v. Helena Light & Ry. Co., 38 Mont. 222, 
99 P. 837. Thus defendants contend that the ad-
Inission of the mortality tables in evidence was 
error in view of the fact that the necessary qual-
ifying instructions with reference thereto weTe 
not subsequently given. 
''Under the authority of the case of Stephens 
v. Elliott, 36 Mont. 92, 92P. 45, the mortality table 
in question was properly admitted in evidence. 
It may be true, as defendants contend, that the 
instructions should have been given qualifying 
the extent of consideration to be given to that 
table. However, this court has held that a dis-
trict court may not be put in error for failure to 
instruct the jury on a given point on its own mo-
tion; that if appellant desired an instruction on 
a subject not covered by the instructions given 
(such as lirni ting the effect of evidence admitted 
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over objection to a certain purpose), it was his 
duty to tender it. State v. Miller, 97 Mont. 434, 
34 P. (2d) 979; Bourke v. Butte, etc. Power Co., 
33 Mont. 267, 83 P. 470. It was defendants' duty 
to offer the instructions which they elaim should 
have been given. Having neglected to do so, they 
cannot now put the court in error for failure to 
give such instructions.'' 
We also quote from Newman vs. Campbell, ( C~al.) 
73 Pac. 2d. 1265, 1266 as follows: 
"As stated, the court instructed as to plain-
tiff's life expectancy, and that the jury might 
take this into consideration in determining her 
damage, if any. It is urged that she was not in 
normal health at the time of her injury, and that 
consequently the instruction was improper. On 
this question also the evidence was conflicting, and 
the jury might have found that the plaintiff was 
for a pe-rson of her age in ordinary health. The 
mortality table was admissible, and, although 
not conclusive, was evidence of the probable dura-
tion of her life. Under the evidence she was en-
titled to an instruction based upon he-r theory 
of the eas·e. Groat v. Walkup Drayage, etc. Co., 
14 Cal. App. 2d. 350, 58 P. 2d 200; Morrow v. 
M:endleson, 15 Cal. App. 2d 15, 58 P. 2d 1302·. 
If the appellant desired an instruction explaining 
in more detail the weight to he given the elements 
fixing her life expectancy, as was the case in 
Groat v. Walkup Drayage, etc. Co., supra, such 
an instruction should h-ave been offered. This was 
not done, and in the -circumstances appellant has 
no ground for complaint. Murphy v. National 
Ice Cream Co., 114 Cal. App. 482, 300 P. 91. 
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Point 2. The court did ~not err in its .other instruc-
tious to the .iury, e.1.:cept to the pre)tt;di.ce of the p,za,ilntiff. 
(a) Evidence of defe'nd.ants' ~negligence was 
clea.r, con-r'incz~ng and ~l!ncont'rtadicted . 
.. A ..s appears from the rather full resume of the evi-
ence under the state1nent of facts, the evidence was undis-
puted that the defendants atten1pted to pass another ve-
hicle in a dust stor1n under circumstances which rend-
ered visibility poor, and that for that purpose defend-
ants operated their truck and trailer on the plaintiff's 
side of the road, 'vithout- assuring themselves sufficient 
time within '\Vhich to complete the passage and return 
to their right hand side • of the road. They attempted 
~uch passage when plaintiff 'vas approaching from the 
o_pposite direction 'vi thou t seeing plain tiff's vehicle in 
tim·e to avoid the collision whieh nccurred on the extreme 
east side of the road. In ~attempting to pass the defend-
ants achieved a speed of approximately 20 miles per 
hour, while other vehicles in the dust storm were holding 
speed to a lesser amount or in the act of stopping. They 
attempted to pass another vehicle which was lengthened 
by the presence of a boat trailer on the back and the 
defendant's vehicle was itself about 6q feet long. 
The conduct of the defendants 'vas grossly negligent 
and reckless and in direct violation of. Section 57-7-124 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, which provides as follows: 
''No vehicle shall be driven to the left side 
of the center of the roadway in overtaking and 
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passing another vehicle proceeding the same di-
rection unless such left side is clearly visible and 
is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient dis-
tance ahead to permit such overtaking and pass-
ing to be completely made without interfering 
\Vi th the safe operation of any vehicle ap·proach-
ing frorn the opposite direction of any vehicle 
overtaken. In every event the overtaking vehicle 
must return to the right-hand side of the road-
.,vay before coming within 100 feet of any vehicle 
approaching from the opposite direction.'' 
It is undisputed in the evidence that the defendants 
failed to maintain a proper and sufficient look-out as 
they attempted to pass the Pace car. Defendant claimed 
that he could see 200 yards up the highway despite the 
dust stor1n, hut that he wasn't looking for a car on the 
opposite side of the road; that the 1fitchell car may have 
been 20 to 25 feet ahead when he first saw it and "\Vas 
straddle the center line; that although he was 'vatching 
both sides of the highway all the time, he didn't see the 
!fitch ell car until it "just came out of no\vh.ere." 
Defendants elailn an en1ergency; they should have 
anticipated the e1nergency which was created hy their 
own folly and they cannot avoid the necessary conse-
quences of their recklessness by their inability to extri-
cate themselves fron1 it. The evidence of excessiYe speed 
under the circun1sta.nces proceeded from the mouth of 
the defendant Van Patten. 
Vv·e sincerely contend that under the evidence plain-
tiff was entitled to a directed verdict on the liability of 
the defendants, though none V\ras requested. 
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(b) I' here zcas no substant-ial evidence of 
contribu_.ta.ry neglige-nce u:hich u~a.rra·nterl t'he sub-
nl.i~~si.on of tha:f defen.se to the Jury. 
The defendants rely upon the 'vitness Pace and the 
defendant \Tan Patten for their evidence of contributory 
negligence~ and very little con1fort is available to them 
from the testin1on}- of either. The ntnnerous inconsist-
encies of \7" an Patten's alibi have been previously pointed 
out. Although , .... an Patten insisted :1fitchell "\vas astrad-
dle the center line, he is most indefinite about the 
approach of the ~~fitehell car, on n1ore than one occasion 
repeating that plaintiff just came out of no,vhere. The 
most significant thing \'an Patten said in regard to the 
r11anner in 'vhich plaintiff "\Vas driving his car was that. he 
did not think ~{r. itfitchell was to blame (R. 451). 
The 'vitness Pace provided defendants "\vith no sub-
stantial help in the discharge of their burden to prove 
contributory negligence. It is true that he stated that 
plaintiff's truck was "probably" straddle of the center 
line when he saw it (R.472), but he testified that he was· 
not required to alter the course of his :au'tomob~e by the 
approach of the ~fitchell car and was able to continue 
straight on his way undisturbed, and that if the plain-
tiff n1ay have momentarily traveled on the center line it 
vvasn't sufficiently far to interfere with the movement of 
Pace's ·car in the opposite direction (R. 477), and all this 
in view of th·e fact that Pace was as near to the middle of 
his lane of traffic a.s he could get (R. 471). 
More-over, the 'vitness Pace could only say that as 
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near as he could tell plaintiff was straddle of the center 
line (R .. 478), but he could not say about how much of 
plaintiff's vehicle was on the west of the center line and 
he would not attempt to say that plaintiff's vehicle was 
as much as a foot to the west of the center line, but that 
as near as he could tell, plaintiff was riding very near the 
center lin·e (R .. 478). 
We deen1 it altogether fair to say that I:.> ace did not 
furnish any evidence which aided the defendants in their 
defense of contributory negligence. It must he remenl-
bered that Pace was in advance of the defendant's truck 
and ordinarily his position \Vould be more likely to he im-
periled by the approach of a car on the 'vrong side in the 
opposite direction than the defendants, yet he was not 
endangered to the slightest extent. We cannot perceive 
in 1vhat possible manner the location of plaintiff's car 
very near the eenter line before the impact could have 
had any causal relationship· with the -collision which oc-
eurred on the extreme east side of the highway. It is in-
eseap;ably clear that 'the cause of the C'ollision was the 
presence of the A-rrowhead truck on the wrong side of the 
road, making an unsuccessful attemp't to p:ass another ve-
hicle in a dust storn1 in violation of the laws of the road 
and in reckless disregard of plaintiff's bodily safety. 
We earnestly invite the eourt to consideT in connec-
tion with the flimsy evidence of 'the ,defen·dants, 'the posi-
tive testimony of Mr. Mitehell, his father and his daugh-
ter, where plaintiff's operati'On of his- car was s·hown to 
he vvithout fault and the testimony of Dr. Broadbent to 
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the effect that ,.,. an Patten adn1itted his responsibility 
for the accident. stating that Hit 'vas entirely my fault." 
(R. 255) 
Finally, the physical facts corroborate the plain-
tiff's position and refute that of the defendants. The de-
fendants can never escape the fact that they collided with 
the left front eorner of plaintiff's truck on the extreme 
east side of the high,vay . 
.. A . t the time of the trial the defendants amended their 
answer to set forth an additional affirmative defens.e, 
to-\vit: that the plaintiff drove his 1946 Chevrolet truck 
while the truck was overloaded with 4 people in the front 
seat, in violation of Section 57-7-170 Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943, which interfered with his control of the 
mechanism of the truck and thereby affected his ability 
to readily n1aneuver said truck and avoid a collision. 
There was not one word of evidence in the record that 
sho\ved that four people overloaded plaintiff's truck, or 
that the presence of the four passengers in the front seat 
interefered \Yith plaintiff'~ driving; and if it \Vas negli-
gence to have four people in the truck under the circum-
stances of this case, it was negligence in the air without 
an~v causal connection whatever with the collision. It was, 
therefore, error for the court to give its instruction No. 
16, \Vhich per1nitted the jury to consider this unestab-
lish defense and to deny recovery to plliaintiff in the 
event they should believe the plaintiff's driving was in-
tP.rfered with by the overloading of his car. With respect 
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to the overloading of his truck, the plaintiff testified as 
follows: 
'' Q. Now in driving the car up at the scene 
of the accident with your daughter sitting be-
side you, did your arm rub against her to any 
extent~ 
A. I wasn't crowded. 
Q. You were not crowded~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. If you went to move the wheel rapidly 
do you think-you know whether or not your 
arm interfered with her in any way when you, 
just before that accident up at-~ 
A. I would say it didn't." (R. 352) 
Joan ~1itchell in this connection testified as follows: 
"Q. You say you were sitting in the middle 
of the seat, Joan, between two other people~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. How close \Vere you to your father's 
arm~ 
A. I don't think he would hav·e hit me if 
anything had hap~pened. 
Q. Do you know whether he did or not~ 
A. No. he didn't." (R. 867) 
(c) Assu1ning rt!he sufficiency of the evidence of 
contrib·utory negligence the oouri, nevertheless, fully 
submitted amd overemphasized suc'h defens1e t1o lt.he jury. 
Except for the statement of plaintiff's claims in in-
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~truction No. 1 ( R. f)3) the court only gave two instruc-
tions submitting to the jury plaintiff's theory of re-
eoYery, instruction~ 7 and 8; and the court conditioned 
recoYery in instruction No. 8 upon the jury finding ''that 
plaintiff 'Yas operating his vehicle in a lawful manner 
upon his side of the highway i1nmediately prior to and at 
the time of the collision.'' ( R. 65). Yet in ·addition to the 
statement of defendants' ·claims in instruction No. 2 (R. 
58), the court gave the follo,ving instructions on defend-
ants' theory of contributory negligence : Nos. 10, 11, 12, 
13, 14 15 and 16. Plaintiff exeepted to the giving of each 
of these instruction as being against the evidence and 
plaintiff further excep:ted to all of the instructions num-
bered 9 to 16 inclusive for the special reason that the said 
instructions placed undue emphasis upon the theory of 
the defendan'ts and were -contrary to the evi·dence taken 
together. (R. 543) Th·e number of instructions given by 
the co1.1.rt in view of the paucity of the evidence in the 
record in sup·port of defendant's theory 'vas far out of 
proportion and constituted an overe1nphasis of the un-
established defen-se of contributory neglig.ence. See 1 
Blashfield 's Instructions Juries, Section 152., page 351 : 
''It is imp-roper for the court to place too 
prominently before the jury any p·rinciple of law 
involved in the case as by frequent r·epetition for 
\vhere a number of instructions announces in 
varying language a single rule of law the effect 
is to unduly imp·ress the single principle an-
nounced upon the jury's minds to the exclusion 
perhaps of other equally important principles.'' 
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The defendants in their brief object to the courts 
instruction No. 6 and 7 on the ground that the two in-
structions eliminated contributory negligence as a de-
fense. They cite numerous cases, the one most nearly in 
point being the case of Beyerle v. Clift, (Cal) 209 Pac. 
1015 frorn which they quote at some length in their brief. 
'"rhat case lays down a principle that it is error for the 
trial court to fail to condition recovery in a so-called 
formula instruction upon the absence of contributory 
negligence assu1ning that the issue of contributory neg-
ligence was properly before the court. The effect of the 
Beyerle v.· Clift case has been avoided in several subse-
quent California descisions to which we shall subse-
quently refer. Be that as it may, the Supreme Court of 
Utah has adopted a contrary rule. 
The case of Olsen v. Oregon S. L. R. R. Co., 24 
Utah 460, 68 Pac. 148 involved an action for the 
\Vrongful death of a person who was struck by defend-
ant's train at a crossing. The plaintiff's decedent \vas 
attempting to cross the tracks in a wagon vvhen the de-
fendant's train at a high speed and without giving warn-
ing of its ap.proach struck the wagon, killing the de-
ceased. We quote from the decision commencing at page 
152 of Pacific Reports: 
''Exception is taken to instruction No. 19, 
wherein the court told the jury: 'If you find from 
the evidence that the crossing upon which the de-
ceased was kill·ed wa.s a public highway, and had 
been used as such for a long number of years 
prior to the accident, and if you further find that 
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a large nun1ber of tearns and persons passed over 
said crossing each day, and at all hours of the 
day, then I charge you that it 'vas the duty of the 
engineer of the train, "rhen approaching the cross-
ing., to have been on the lookout for teams and 
persons on the crossing, or in such close p-roxi-
nlity thereto as to be in danger of colliding with 
the train, then to use all reasonable care and dili-
gence and make use of all the appliances at his 
command to have the train under control, and 
stop if necessary to avoid a collision with and 
injury to such team or persons; and if you further 
find that the engineer was negligent in not keep-
ing such lookout, and in not discovering the peril 
of the deceased in time to have avoided the acci-
dent, and that he did or could have discov-ered 
him, and the peril he was in, in time to avoid the 
collision, if he had been on the lookout, then I 
c!large you that the defendant is liable for the 
killing of Olson, and the plaintiffs ar·e entitled 
to recoYer in this action.' This instruction should 
be considered and construed in connection with 
the other instructions bearing upon the whole 
subject. The seventh instruction reads as fol-
lO\\-s: 'You are charged that it was the duty of 
the deceased, as he approached the said crossing 
just before the time of the accident which resulted 
in his death, to both listen for and look in the 
direction fron1 which the train approached, to 
ascertain if any train was approaching, and it 
was his duty to continue to so listen and look 
until he had crossed said railroad. The failure 
of the company, if it did, to ring the bell, sound 
its whistle, or give any alarm of its approach, 
did not relieve the deceas-ed from the obligation 
to perform the said duty of listening and look-
ing, and if the said deceased, as he approached 
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said crossing, by the use of his senses of sight 
and hearing in looking and listening for the ap-
proach of the said train, could have discovered 
that it was approaching, and have avoided said 
collision, then the plaintiffs cannot recover in 
this case.' The eighth instruction is as follows: 
'If, without so looking and listening for an ap-
proaching train, a person attempts to cross a 
railroad track, and is injured by a passing train, 
his own careless conduct is deemed, in law, to have 
assisted in bring about the injury, and he cannot 
complain of the other party concerned in the 
transaction, even though such other p~arty may 
have also been negligent.' It is contended that 
the tenth instruction omits the subject of contri-
butory negligence. The charge, taken as a whole, 
·fully covered the question of negligence on the 
part of the defendant, and_ contributory negli-
gence on the part of the plaintiff. It is not always 
possible to cover all the questions arising in a 
case in one sentence or paragraph. It is sufficient 
if the whole charge, when taken and construed 
together, states the law fairly and correctly. As 
said in Hamer v. Bank, ·g Utah, 220, 33 Pac. 941: 
'The mere omission in one part of the charge by 
the court of certain elements, though material, 
when they are substantially given in another part, 
will not be ground for reversing the judgment. 
On this point, Thomp.son, in his work on Trials 
(Volume 2, Section 2407), states the law as fol-
lows: 'The charge is entitled to a reasonable in-
terpretation. It is construed as a whole, in the 
same connected way in which it was given, upon 
the presum'ption that the jury did not overlook 
any portion, but gave due w·eight to it as a whole; 
and this is so although it consist of clauses origin-
ating with different counsel, and applicable to 
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different phases of the evidence. If, when so con-
strued, it presents the la'v fairly and correctly 
to the jury, in a n1anner not calculated to mislead 
then1, it "Till afford no ground for reversing the 
judg1nent. althol1gh so1ne of its expressions, if 
standing alone, nug·ht be regarded as erroneous, 
or because there may be an apparent conflict be-
t,veent isolated sentences, or because its parts 
Inay be in some respects slightly repugnant to 
each other, or because some of them, taken ab-
stractedly, may have been erroneous." ' Ander-
~on v. ~lining Co., 16 Utah 38, 50 Pac. 815; Sta;te 
YS. ~IeCoy·, 15 Utah 141, 49 Pac. 420; Reese vs. 
~fining Co., 17 Utah 496, 54 Pac. 759." 
If instruction No. 7 and instructions No. 10, 11, 12, 
13, 14, 15 and 16 were consolidated into one instruction 
and given by the trial court, there could be no error. 
There is no eonflict of the lavv in the different instruc-
tions and if taken together or considered as a series, 
they present the la'v n1uch more favorably to the defend-
ants than they were entitled. They, therefore, have no 
just complaint . 
. A.nother Utah case directly in point in this respect 
is the case of :Jforgan "'"l. }[ammoth ~fining Co., 1903, 72 
Pac. 88, which involved an instruction that directed a 
verdict for the plaintiff if the jury an1ong other things 
found that certain chairs which struck plaintiff \vere out 
of repair or out of \Yorking order. The instruction did 
not cPntain a qualification that the chairs mllSt have been 
out of repair a sufficient length of ti1ne to enable the 
defendant by· the exercise of ordinary care, to discover 
and re1nedy the defect, a for1nula instruction 'vith a 
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necessary element missing. The court said, at page 689: 
''This criticism might be regarded as having 
some force if the matter of knowledge of the de-
fective condition of the chairs ~r notice thereof 
were explained nowhere else in the charge. In 
paragraph 5, however, the law respecting this 
subject is clearly stated ... when, therefore, the 
two paragraphs are read together, and are con-
sidered in connection with the evidence to the 
effect that the defects had existed for a period of 
about 2 months prior to the time of the accident, 
there appears to be no reason for assuming or 
holding that the jury were misled, under these cir-
cumstances. It being conceded that paragraph 
6, abstractly considered, does not state the law 
vvith absolute precision, still it does not amount to 
reversible error. Where, as here, a charge con-
sidered as a whole states the law applicable to 
the case fairly and correctly, it is sufficient. Olsen 
vs. OSLRR, 24 Utah 460, 68 Pac. 148.'' 
The holding in the Beyerle v. Clift ease also flies in 
the face of our statute, Section 104-39-3, Utah Code An-
notated, 1943, which provides: No exception shall he 
raised unless the decision excepted to is material and 
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the parties except-
ing.'' 
The case of State v. McCoy, 15 Utah 141, 49 Pac. 
421, holds as follows : 
'' . . . . Instructions must be considered to-
gether and omission to fully state the la'v in one 
part of the instruction, where the omission is fully 
and accurately sup,plied in the instructions which 
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follo,v, does not constitute reversible error, un-
less when from the whole charge it is reasonably 
apparent the jury 'vere misled, citing cases.'' 
To the sa1ne effect is the case of Roth v. Chatlos, 97 
Conn. 282, 116 .... \tlantic, 332. In that ease the court gave 
the follow·ing instructions, appearing at page 333: 
"If you find that the .defendants' driver, by 
siinply continuing on the right hand side of the 
highway, could have avoided the accident, then 
your verdict must necessarily be for the plain-
tiff. He n1ust prove one of the grounds of negli-
gence, but he need not prove all of them ; and 
if you find that said automobile was being driven 
at a dangerous rate of speed and that said acci-
dent could not have been avoided had said auto-
mobile been driven at a lower speed, then your 
verdict must necessarily be for the plaintiff. 
''This request was ·erroneously received since 
it left out of consideration the plaintiff's contri-
butory negligence and left to the jury the deter-
mination of the defendant's conduct as the sole 
issue of the jury's verdict, when the plaintiff's 
conduct, as well as the defendant's was upon the 
claims of the parties and the evidence before the 
jury, essential to a proper verdict. 
''This request was read to the jury in the 
early part of the charge, and thereaft,er with 
great fullness and sufficient accuracy, the trial 
court properly p·resented to the jury both of these 
issues :-the negligence of the defendant, and the 
contributory negligence of the plaintiff. This was 
done in such a way, that we think it quite impos-
sible that the jury should have failed to have 
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understood that their finding that the plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence would bar 
his recovery, and so too, we think the jury must 
have understood in what the plaintiff's contri-
butory negligence was claimed to have consisted.'' 
The principle is also recognized in 14 Ruling Case 
I_.~aw, 813: 
''And also instructions given ignoring facts 
tending to establish a defens-e, the defendant can-
not complain if such defense is covered in other 
instructions given at his request.'' 
To the same effect is St. Louis Southeast Railway 
Co. v. Graham, Arkansas, 102 Southwest 700 ·at 702: 
"Criticisms are made of some of the instruc-
tions in that they seem to permit a recovery if 
the jury finds the defendant guilty of negligence, 
without qualification, and unless they find the 
deceased not guilty of contributory negligence. 
Taking thes·e instructions as a whole, the court 
thinks that they make it clear to the jury that 
contributory negligence on the part of the de-
ceased would defeat a recovery, even should they 
find the defendant guilty of negligence. It is gen-
erally impossible to state all the law of the case 
in one instruction, and if the various instructions 
separately present every phase of its as a har-
Inonious whole, there is no error in each instruc-
tion faiHng to carry qualifications which ar·e ·ex-
plained in others, citing cases.'' 
See also Meadows v. Pacific Mutual Life· Insurance 
Co., l\fisf:ouri, 1895, 31 Southwest 578. 
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In the California case of Bro\Yer Y. Arnstein, 14 Pac. 
2d 863, the court attempts to distinguish the facts of that 
ease frou1 the earlier ~ase of Beyerle v. Clift, supra, but 
nevertheless holds that the giving of for1nula instructions 
ackno,vledged to lack esstential elements of recovery 
" ... as not reversible error \vhere other"}'ise instructed 
upon. \"'{ e quote fron1 that case beginning at page 865 : 
··Appellant also urges various and sundry 
clain1s of error against instructions given and re-
fused by the trial court. The most vigorously 
pressed of these clain1s relate to the alleged fail-
ure of certain so-called 'formula' instructions 
to individually contain a recital of all the elements 
essential to recovery by plaintiff. If these instruc-
tions are by a process of dislocation fro1n the gen-
eral charge, so separated from each other as to 
then be viewed ''ith over-technical nicety, they 
\Yould unquestionalbly be subject to the objec-
tions urged by appellant. But the very method 
of the giving of these so-called 'formula'' instruc-
tions indicates plainly that they were not intended 
to so operate or to have such effect. They were 
merely intended in the first instance to advise 
the jury how their verdict should go in the event 
the respectiv.e matters set forth in the pleadings 
were either established or failed of establishment 
one way or the other. In other 'vords, the instruc-
tions were not intended to, nor did they purport 
to state the several elements essential to a verdict 
as such in detail, but, instead, those matters were 
made the subject of separate specific instructions; 
the court's intention being merely to supply by 
reference to the pleadings a statement as to how 
the verdict of the jury should go in the event 
plaintiff did or did not establish negligence as 
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charged in his pleadings, or in the event he did 
so establish negligence as charged in his plead-
ings, or in the event he did so establish such negli-
genee, how in such event the verdict should then 
go if contributory negligence was or was not es-
tablished. They were not 'fon:nula' instructions 
of the type condemned in Beyerle v. Clift, 59 Cal. 
App. 7, 9, 209 P. 1015, where the pleaded element 
of contributory negligence was entirely omitted 
from an instruction directing a verdict. However, 
the particular omission in the instructions upon 
which ap~pellant places the most stress is their 
s·erious failure to at any time define or express in 
direct terms the principle of 'proximate cause.' 
This is indeed a most serious omission, and we 
are not unmindful that in reversing the case of 
Long v. Barbieri (Cal.) App. 7 P. (2d) 1082., 1087, 
because of certain instructions of a more obvious-
ly ·erroneous character, we indicated the added 
weight that had been given the errors in ques-
tion because of the similar failure of the trial 
court to define 'proximate cause,' by declaring: 
'It should be further noted that the trial court 
omitted to give any instruction whatsoever de-
fining 'p·roximate caus·e,' and the jury were thus 
left to their own varying conceptions, if any, as 
to what might constitute this always related and 
ev~er essential principle of the doctrines of negli-
gence and contributory negligence.' 
''It must therefore be conceded that in fail-
ing to directly define and present to the jury for 
their consideration, the legal principle embraced 
within the term 'p,roximate cause' the trial court 
committed an ·error of no inconsiderable magni-
tude. Its effect, however, is substantially weaken-
ed and mitigated in the present case by and 
through the effect of the very numherous and de-
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tailed instructions given by the court at the re-
quest of defendant, in 'vhich almost every con-
ceivable element of the multitude of defensive 
principles of law .. open to and urged by him were 
specifically presented to the jury. These directly 
set forth the Inany and num·erous circumstances 
upon " ... hich, in the event their existence was es-
tablished by the evidence, the verdict of the jury 
1nay just be for defendant, or plaintiff could not 
reeover; and a.n1ong these in connection with the 
terms 'negligence' or 'negligent' the word 'p·roxi-
mately' is frequently used. 
~'The jury was also instructed: ' * * * Where 
negligence is charged, it devolves upon the person 
charging it, if he \vould prevail as to that charge, 
to establish * * * it by a preponderance of evi-
dence.' The court also, and as a part of its gen-
eral charge, re-peatedly instruct the jury in the 
utmost detail upon numerous matters that would 
constitute negligence on the part of plaintiff, and 
thus defeat recovery. At no time did the ap.pel-
lant now urging the error of its omission, tender 
to the court an instruction defining 'proximate 
cause,' or request that qualifying instructions to 
those of which he complains be given. 
''The cumulatjve effect of these considera-
tions leads us to place our determination of the 
merit of appellant's contention (that the failure 
of these instructions to ·define 'proximate cause' 
is reversible error) fairly within the scope of the 
expression of a similar determination arrived at 
by our Supreme Court, in Wirthman v. Isensein, 
182 Cal. 108, 110, 111, 187 P. 12, 13, where it is 
declared: ' * * * where, as here, the court in-
structs that, to entitle respondent to recover, ap~ 
pellants must be guilty of negligence 'as alleged 
in the complaint', and that respondent himself 
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1nust be blameless and free from any contribu-
tory negligence, it must have been made perfectly 
clear to the jury that a finding by them that ap·pel-
lants were guilty of the negligence so described, 
the respondent himself being blameless, would of 
necessity runount to a finding that such negligence 
was the proximate cause of the injury. Weaver 
vs. Carter, 28 Cal. App. 241, 152 P. 323. Further-
more, the court's instructions, so far as they went, 
correctly stated the law, and if appellants de-
sired a qualifying instruction to the effect that, 
to entitle respondent to recover, appellants' negli-
gence 1nust be the proximate cause of the injury, 
it \vas incumbent upon ,their counsel to either 
ask the court to give such qualifying instruction, 
which it undoubtedly would have done, or have 
presented an instruction e1nbodying it. Having 
failed to do either, appellants are in no position 
to con1plain of the instructions given. Weaver 
vs. Carter, supra; Townsend vs. Butterfield, 168 
Cal. 564, 143 P. 760; O'Connor vs. United Rail-
roads, 168 Cal. 43, 141 P. 809.' " 
Abbot Y. Goodyear rrire & Rubber Co. (California) 
3 Pac. 2d 56, 57, is a very good case. l't states: 
"Ap~pellant first complains of instruction 
~J o. 12, which infor1ns the jury as to the amount 
of recovery to \Vhich respondents are entitled if 
the jury finds certain facts to be true. The criti-
cism of the instruction is that it is a 'formula' 
instruction 'vhich fails to include the essential 
elen1ent of knowledge of the falsity of the repre-
sentations on the ·part of the appellant. There 
are several ans,vers to the criticism. Tt 'vill suf-
fice to say that in instructions 1 to 11 the jury 
had been advised of the allegations of the com-
plaint charging fraud; that instruction No. 3 
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particularly dealt \vith the allegations respecting 
Datml's knowledge of the falsity of the represen-
tations co1nplained of; and that instruction No. 12 
directed a verdict for respondents if the jury 
found that all these representations· were made 
and that respondents had been deceived 'as al-
leg·ed '. The con1plaint fully alleged ·every essen-
tial eleinent for recovery in a case of this kind 
and the instruction co1nplained of took all these 
allegations into consideration. This is not a ·case 
of a directed verdict on a single is_sue or upon a 
limited nlmlber of the issues involved. All the 
instructions n1ust be read together and, in so read-
ing then1, \Ve find no conflict between No. 12 and 
those preceding, but a general summary telling 
for a Yerdict. The case is somewhat similar to 
the jury of every element whieh must be found 
Robinet v. H·awks, 200 Gal. 265, 273, 252, P. 1045, 
where the trial court used the expression 'under 
the instructions as I have given them to you.' See 
also Douglas v. Southern Pacific Co., 203 Cal. 
390, 394, 2·64 P. 237, vvhere the Supreme Court 
holds in effect that where, as here, the instruction 
con1plained of does not purport to be a complete 
statement of the lavv upon which plaintiff's might 
recover and the other instructions are amplifica-
tions of and not in conflict wiht that instruction 
the objection of' forn1ula' instruction is not sound. 
Putting it in other words, when the t;one of the 
instructions as a whole denot.es that no single 
instruction w·as iJnt·ended to be a .comp.Zete st1at:e-
1nent in itself b~tt tha;t all the instructi.ons ~are to 
be t.aken togeth,er 0/Yltd, when thes,e irnsfiruct1ions 
fully aud oorrectly sta.te the law ~v·ithout conflict, 
_then n.o 10ne instruction m.a.y be singled out for 
criticis1n beoause it does n.ot completely state 
all the elements necessary for recovery.'' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
114 
In its instructions 1 and 2, the court set out a sum-
Inarized statement of the issue, No. 1 containing the 
claims of the plaintiff and No. 2 containing the claims of 
the defendant as raised by the pleadings. Then the 
court gave the following instruction No. 3: 
''You are instructed that, before the plaintiff 
can recover on his first cause of action, that said 
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence one or n1ore of the acts of neg1igenee 
alleged by hiin in his complaint, his injury and 
damage, and that said alleged negligence upon the 
part of the defendants was the proximate cause 
of his injury and damage ; and, in this connection, 
you are instructed that, unless the plaintiff meets 
this burden, that he is not entitled to recover, and 
you are instructed that you should find the issues 
in favor of the defendants and against the plain-
tiff. You are likewise instructed that, if the evi-
dence on these issues is equally balanc.ed between 
the plaintiff and the defendants, or preponderates 
in favor of the defendants, that you should find 
the issues in favor of the defendants and against 
the plaintiff. If. hovvever, the plaintiff does prove 
one or 1nore of the acts acts of negligence on the 
part of the defendants, his damage and injury, 
and that said negligence was the pToximate cause 
thereof by preponderance of the evidence, then 
the plaintiff is entitled to have the issue of lia-
bility decided in his favor, and against the de-
fendants, and you are to assess damages therefor 
in accordance with the instructions hereinafter 
given you upon the 1neasure of damages, unless 
you find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the plaintiff 'vas guilty of one or more of the acts 
of negligenee alleged hy the defendants which 
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proximately caused, or proxin1ately contributed 
to, the plaintiff's injury and damage, the burden 
of v.rhich is upon the defendants to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence.'' 
Here, in1n1ediatel~~ follo,ving the statement of the 
claims of the parties the court instructed that plaintiff 
could not recoYer if he 'vas guilt~T of one or n1ore of the 
acts of contributory negligence eharged by the defendant. 
The case seems to fit perfectly into the exception to the 
rule of Beyerle Y. Clift, supra, laid down by the more 
recent California case of Abbot v. Goodyer Tire & Rub-
ber Company, supra. 
Further indication that the tone of the instructions 
was to the effect that they must he considered as a whole 
is found in the court's instruction No. 14 wherein the 
court stated: . . . ''and that said collision was solely 
caused, or proximately contributed to by the carelessness 
and negligence of plaintiff, J. Harold Mitchell, if any 
you find, ,as outlined in these instruotions, then plaintiff 
cannot recover and your verdict should be in favor of 
defendants and against plaintiff, no cause of action.'' 
Moreover instruction No. 5 defines the various 
terms that appear in the various instructions. 
Again in its Instruction No. 9 the court stated: 
~'Therefor, if for any reason you find ther,e 
is no liability in this case on the part of the defen-
dant, Marvin C. Van Patten, as defilned in these 
;inst.ructions, then you will find there is no liability 
on the part of both defendants.'' 
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That instruction directs the attention of the JUry 
to the instructions as a whole. 
In its Instruction 25 the court told the jury: 
''You should weigh the evidence carefully 
and consider all of it together ... 
''You should consider all the evidence im-
partially, fairly and 'vithout prejudice of any 
·kind, and from such consideration, in connecti.orn 
tvith the instruc~ions given you by t'he aovurt, you 
should reach such a verdict as will do justice be-
tvveen the parties.' ' 
1'hat instruction in effect told the jury that the in-
structions should be considered together in connection 
with the evidence. 
Certainly, it is fair to state that the " tone of the 
instructions as a whole" denoted "that no single instruc-
tion was intended to be a compiete statement in itself, 
but that the instructions were to be taken together.'' 
Also holding that the instructions must he con-
sidered as a whole is the case of Nell v. Smith, Iowa, 147 
N. W. 183. 
Counsel refer to the case of Saltas v. Affle·ck, 
'99 Utah 381, 105 P. 2d 1'76, on page 47 ·of their 
brief, and state that 't~he couJrt held that the im-
position of a greater duty upon the defendant that the 
law requires was p·rejudicial error. That case 'vas re-
versed upon the ground of prejudicial conduct on the 
part of plaintiff's counsel, in questioning the jury- panel 
in regard to liability insurance. There was further error 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
117 
on the part of the trial court in giving an instruction 
to the .effect that it was the du1ty of the defendant to 
drive his automobile on the higll\vay, using reasonable 
eare and prudence so that he could avoid injuring any-
one, or coljding with any person on the highvva.y. ''The 
col1rt held that the instruction failed to take into account 
the right of the defendant to assume that all other per-
sons on the high\vay 'vould use ordinary care and reason-
able precautions for their own safety. The opinion does 
not state that. the error was prejudicial and the ease w:as 
apparently reversed on the ground of misconduct of 
colmsel. In his special concurring opinion, concurred in 
by I\Ir. Justice \Volfe, ~fr. Justice ThicDonough stated that 
\vhile the instruction taken alone, 1vas erroneous, the in-
structions read as a whole could not have misled the 
jury, and consequently, the giving of the instruction was 
not reversible error. 
The recent case of Martin v. Sheffield, 189 Pac. 2d. 
127, does not support defendant's position. In that case· 
there was evidence which would have justified a finding 
of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff yet 
the court gave no instructions submitting this theory of 
defense to the jury, except t'\vo stock instructions, one 
defining contributory negligence, but telling the jury 
nothing with respect to its legal effect, the other relating 
to the burden of proof. In that case Chief Justice Mc-
Donough states : 
''Such instruction, unelucidated in any other 
. part of the charge, might well be construed by the 
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jury to mean that though the jury found negli-
gence on the part of the plaintiff which ,proxi-
lnately contributed to the accident, nevertheless, 
plain tiff was entitled to a verdict. 
''Viewing the instructions as a whole, we 
.conclude that the court failed although requested 
by the defendant to do so, to advise the jury as 
to the effect of alleged negligence on the part of 
the p~laintiff, should it find that such negligence 
proximately contributed to her own injury. This 
was pr·ejudicial error. 
'' ... We are mindful of the rule that an in· 
struction must be read in the light of the whole 
charge in determining whether it was calculated to 
mislead the jury. A careful examination of the 
whole charge convinces us that the misleading 
effect of instruction No. 9 was not erased by the 
import of the instructions as a whole.'' 
In eliminating the words, ''such instruction, uneluci-
dated in any other part of the charge'' from their quo-
tation of the Chief Justice's statement, counsel imparted 
an effeet to it quite foreign to the import of the state-
Inent as a whole. Fully quoting the expression confirms 
our position and renders defendants' untenable. We fe·el 
constrained to remind counsel for the defendants, that 
to partially quote is to misquote, and the op~inions of 
this court, like the instructions to the jury, must be con-
strued as a whole, or they may be misconstrued. 
In the Sheffield case, there wa.s no other instruction, 
submitting the theory of contributory negligence to the 
jury. In this case, the theory was pres~ented in each 
of the follo"~ing instructions: Nos. 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 
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15 and 16. It \Vould be flying in the fare of the record 
to say that the failure of the court to condition recover~y 
upon the absence of eontributory negligence in its in-
struction X o. 7. \\Tas not other\Yise elucidated b~· the 
charge. 
The court a1nplified its instruction No. 6 ~etting 
forth the n1aster ·s responsibility for the negligent act 
or omissions of its servants by Instruction No. 9. In 
Instruction No. 9 (R. 66) the court instructed the jury 
as follo,vs : 
· ·1~ ou are instructed that in this case, there 
is no claim of any careless or negligent act 
on the part of the defendant, Arrowhead Freight 
Lines, Ltd., a corporation and there is no evidence 
of negligence on the part of said defendant. 
The only negligence claimed is on account of the 
acts or conduct of th·e defendant, Marvin C. Van 
Patten, in driving and operating the truck and 
trailer he was driving at the time of the accident. 
Therefore, if there is any liability upon the part 
of the defendant, Arrowhead Freight Lines, Ltd., 
it must be based upon the liability of the defend-
ant, ~I arvin C. \l an Patten, for his act or acts 
in the op.eration of said truck and not because of 
any nlisconduct on the part of the defendant, 
.. A.rro"'.,.head Freight Lines, Ltd., by reason of the 
la\v "~hich makes an employer responsible for the 
acts of its employees performed 'vithin the course 
and scope of their employment. 
''Therefore, if for any rea.son you find there 
is no liability in this ca.se on the part of the de-
fendant, Marvil C. 'Tan Patten, as define-d in 
these instructions, then you will find there is no 
liability on the part of both defendants." 
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Moreover, as was heretofore pointed out, there was 
no substantial evidence of contributory negligence 
in this cas-e. So that such defense was not properly be-
fore the court and should not have been submitted to 
the jury. Therefore, the trial court was not authorized 
or required to qualify its Instruction No. 7 with a condi-
tion that the jury 1nust f1nd plaintiff free from con-
tributory negligence. 
~gain Instruction No. 7 represented a proper state-
ment of the law. There was no improper language or 
1nis-sta.tement of principle in the instruction. It 'vas not, 
therefore, contrary to or in conflict with any other in-
struction given by the court. An inconsistent instruction 
would be one, for instance, where the court would state 
to the jury that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff 
and then subsequently charging that the burden of proof 
of the same matter was on the defendants. There was no 
state1nent made in any part of the court's charge which 
vvas inconsistent with any statement contained in Instruc-
tion No. 7. 
The court's Instruction 1\fo. 6 was not a formula 
instruction. It n1erely presented to the jury the legal 
princip[e of respondeat 'Superior so that the jury would 
know that the master is liable for the negligent acts 
and omissions of his servant. The jury could not have 
been 1nisled by that instruction, and it contained an 
altogether proper statement of a legal principle which 
vvas applicable to the ·evidence in the case. 
To summarize, the defendants' objections to ins true-
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tions No~. 6 and 7 are 'vithout 1nerit for the following 
reasons. 
1. The instruction No. 6 'vas not a forinula instruc-
tion but contained a p.roper state1nent of the law ap-
plicable to the evidence. 
2. The court qualified instruction No. 6 by its In-
struction X o. 9, 'vhich is a further indication that the 
instructions were to be construed together. 
3. Instruction No. 7 vvas a proper instruction on 
Jne of the plaintiff's theories of recovery which was 
legally accurate and sufficient and fully supported by 
the evidence. 
4. Although the defendants' negligence was so glar-
ing as to constitute negligence as a matter of law, the 
court, nevertheless, in the instructions objected to permit-
ted the jury to determine whether the defendants were 
negligent or not. So that under the evidence the instruc-
tions objected to were more favorable to the defendants 
than the record justifies. 
5. It was clear from the tenor of the instructions 
given by the court that the jury was to consider all of 
the instructions as a whole, and considering all of the 
instructions as a whole the court not only submitted 
defendants' theories to the jury, but overe1nphasized 
then1. 
6. There was no substantial evidence of contribu-
tory negligence and the court should not have submitted 
that defense to the jury at all. 
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7. rrhe defendants' exceptions, as will be argued in 
the next point, \vere inadequate and were not calculated 
Lo infor1n the court of the defendants' claimed defects 
in the court's charge. 
Poilnt 3. The defend(Jffl)ts ·d~id not properl;y 
except t·o the i.nstruot~ons they now con~plain ·Of 
and oannot ·ur9e such exce:ptions on a.ppe·al. 
Defendants now complain that the court failed to 
condition rec.overy, in giving its Instructions 6, 7, and 
10, upon the absence of contributory negligence. They 
made no such claim before the trial court at the time 
they took their exceptions. It is true that the defendants 
excepted to the whole of each instruction and also to 
stated parts of each instruction, but there was nothing 
in the exceptions calculated to direct the attention of 
the trial c.ourt to the error claim·ed. 
\V e are mindful of the provisions of Section 104-24-
18 Utah Code Annotated 1943, which contains the same 
language as Revised Statutes 1898, Sec. 3151, to the 
eff-ect that "No reasons need be given for such excep-
tions, but the exceptions shall he noted upon the n1inutes 
of the court . . . '' This statutory provision, however, 
was construed by the Supreme Court of Utah in the 
case of Nebeker v. Harvey, 21 Utah 363, from which we 
quote as follows, beginning at 37 4: 
''Numerous other errors relating to the 
charge of the court were assigned but in the ab-
sence of proper exceptions, we cannot consider 
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them. The exception8 are too general, simply re-
ferring to "·hole paragraphs of the charge. To be 
of avail in the appellate court, they 1nust sp·ecify 
the particular objectionable n1atter so as to give 
the trial judge an opportunity to make a correc-
tion, not,vithstanding that it is provided in Sec-
tion 3131, R.evised Statutes that: 'No reason need 
be given for such exceptions.' That section does 
not authorize the making of wholesale exceptions 
'vithout reference to the specific matter which 
is claimed to be objectionable. The reason of the 
rule which requires the specific objectionable mat-
ter to be pointed out in the presence of the jury, 
is obvious. If the objection to the matter be well 
taken, the court may then make the correction 
called for and thus, not only save the expense of 
another trial, but also the time of the court. The 
rule has been firmly establishe·d in this state, 
Poole v. Southern Pacific Co., 20 Utah 210, 58 
Pac. 326, 333. Brigham City v. Crawford, 20 Utah 
130, 57 Pac. 842.; Wilson v. Sioux Consolidated 
Thiining Co., 16 Utah 91, ·99; People v. Hart, 10 
Utah 204; Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 91, 
99.'' 
To the same effect is Boyd v. San Pedro, L. A. & 
S. L. R. R. Company, 45 Utah 449, 146 Pac. 282; State 
v. Riley, 41 Utah 225, 126 Pac. 294; Goldberg v. Gintoff 
(Vt.) 20 Atl. 2d 114; Connelly v. Felsway Motor Mart 
Inc. C~fass.) 170 N. E. 467, 469; Sacramento Suburban 
Fruitlands Co. v. Loucks (CCA 9) 36 Fed. 2d 921. 
In the case at bar the trial court might well have 
assumed that the defendants had in mind in their ex-
ception to the last six lines of Instruction No. 7 that 
the court erred in permitting the jury to determine 
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from a preponderance of the evidence that the negli-
gence of the defendants was the proximate cause of the 
collision; and the court was fully justified in disregard-
ing the exception as made, for the legal principle stated 
in the instruction were in all resp·ects correctly stated. 
If there was any error in the instruction it was in the 
onlission in that particular instruction to condition 
recovery upon the absence of contributory negligence. 
There was no error in the language or principle as stated. 
The only way that defendants could have possibly 
directed the attention of the trial court to the error of 
omission would be by excepting to the failure of the 
court to condition recovery in its instruction No. 7 upon 
the plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence. 
That would not be necessarily the assignn1ent of a rea-
son for the exception. Defendants would not have to 
say the court erred in failing to condition recovery upon 
the ·plaintiff's freedon1 from contributory negligence for 
the reason, for instance, that there was evidence in the 
record to support it. They would, however, be required 
to call the court's attention to the necessity for amplify-
ing the charge. 
In Wilson vs. Sioux Consolidated Mining Co., 16 
Utah 392, 398, Justice Bartch stated that an ·exception 
to be of avail in an appellate court should, in a case where 
any portion of the charge is. correct, be strictly confined 
to the objectionable matter, and the judge's attention 
called thereto at the time of the delivery of the charge, 
so that an opportunity may be afforded him to make 
correction. 
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In the recent ease of Fo,vler vs. Medical Arts Build-
ing Company, et. al., 188 Pac. 2d 711, (Utah), the 
Supre1ne Court of Utah eriticized the taking of general 
exceptions 'vhich "~ere not calculated to advise the trial 
court of the reasons for the exceptions. 
An Oreg·on case in point is that of Davis vs. Puckett 
Co., 14! Oregon 332, 23 Pac. 2d. 909, from which we 
quote (page 334 of the Oregon 'report): 
• · . . . . These exceptions fail to show any 
grounds for defendants' alleged assignments of 
error. These exceptions do not disclose wherein 
the instructions were alleged to be incorrect or 
insufficient, and did not give the trial court an 
opportunity to correct the error, if any, by amp-
lifying the instructions or eliminating objection-
able matter. For these reasons we ;do not feel 
warranted in considering the objections now 
urged thereto. (citing cases) '' 
To the same effect is Cook vs. Retzlaff, (Oregon) 99 
p. 2d. 22, 23. 
Defendants may claim that their exceptions were 
specific in that they excepted to certain lines of the in-
structions, etc. Enlightening in this connection is the 
case of Senita vs. Marcy, 324 Pa. 109, 188 A. 153, at 
page 201 Pennsylvania reports: 
''While appellants' counsel excepted partic-
ularly to this portion of the charge quoting merely 
what the court said. He did not state the reason 
for the exception nor call the court's attention 
to the 1nistake in his recital of the evidence. When 
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a trial judge errs in his comments upon testimony, 
counsel must call his attention to the real testi-
mony in the ease, if he does not, he cannot take 
advantage of it on appeal." 
Again in the case of Shortino vs. Salt Lake & Utah 
l{ailroa.d Company, 52 Utah 476, 174 Pac. 869, 866, the 
court made the following staternent: 
. 
''Counsel for defendant excepted to 20 of 
the 35 paragraphs. The exception invariably 
reads as follows: 'Defendant excepts to instrue-
tion No. ____ ,' stating the number of the paragraph 
excepted to. We have repeatedly held-indeed, 
-vve have so often decided it that it has become ,ele-
rnentary-that unless the entire paragraph is vul-
nerable such an exception presents nothing for 
review. As before stated, each paragraph of the 
court's charge, with p,erhaps one or two excep-
tions, containHd more than one legal pToposition. 
A general exception to the whole paragraph, 
therefore, may refer to any one of several propo-
sitions contained in the paragraph. The purpose 
of taking an exception to an instruction is to di-
rect the trial court's attention to the legal proposi-
tion 'vhich it is contended is faulty. The fault may 
lie in an omission, or in a word, a phrase, or sen-
tence, or in several sentences. vVhile no reason 
need be assigned for the exception, yet if an 
alleged faulty statement of law consists in a word, 
phrase, or sentence, or in a series of sentences, 
the exception should be limited to such word, 
phrase, sentence, or sentences, so that the trial 
court n1ay examine them, and, if possible, correct 
the error. If, therefore, an exception is to the 
whole paragra:ph, it is a matter of mere conjecture 
what portion of the same is intended to be ex-
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cepted to. Nor does such a general exception pre-
sent anything to this court for review unless the 
'vhole paragraph excepted to is faulty, which is 
seldom the case. In vievv, therefore, of the gen-
eral nature of the exceptions, we cannot review 
the 1na.ny errors assigned relating to the instruc-
tion.'· 
In eonclusion, on this point \Ve -will quote fron1 1 
Blashfield 's Instructions Juries, Second Edition, Page 
937: 
'' Inasn1uch as only errors will be considered 
on ap·peal as are called to the attention of the 
trial court, it follows that exceptions must specify 
particularly the alleged error complained of. A 
party excepting n1ust make his exceptions so spe-
cific that the matter relied on as error will he 
apparent to his adversary, and to the primary 
court. For his adversary having his attention 
directed to the special matter relied on as erron-
eous has the right and privilege of waiving such 
1natter, rather than, by insisting on it, incur the 
hazard and delay of an appeal to a superior trib-
ual. The court having its attention directed to 
the erroneous matter, might be· satisfied with the 
error into which it may have fallen through inad-
vertence and could voluntarily correct it by a 
reversal of its rulings and thus protect the party 
excepting from all injury. 
''The exceptions should not be less definite 
and specific than when made in the appellate 
court, and exceptions which do not clearly and 
specifically point out the objectionable part of 
the instructions can not be sustained. It should 
also he noted that upon obvious principles only 
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those grounds of exceptions will be considered on 
appeal which were stated to the trial court.'' 
It is clear from the foregoing authorities that the 
purpose of exceptions is not to permit a defendant to 
cagily conceal the purpose of the exception and the 
basis of it from the trial court in order to lay the founda-
tion for a reversal on appeal. But the purpose of the 
exception is to apprise the trial court of the p_articular 
error con1plained of in order to enable the trial court 
to re-exan1ine his instruction and if possible correct the 
error by amplifying his charge or by deleting from his 
charge the objectionable material. We think it fair to 
say that none of the defendants' exceptions to the in-
structions given by the court met with these standards, 
and that none of the exceptions taken in the trial were 
calculated to direct the court's attention to the errors 
con1plained of. 
P.o~nt 4. The court did not err -in its failture 
t.o give defendants' requ:ested instructions. 
The defendants object to the failure of the court to 
give the second half of their requested instruction No. 6. 
They assert that the court erred in not including the 
follo\\~ing language in its instruction No. 13: 
''And if you find from the evidence that the 
plaintiff, J. Harold ~Iitchell, was guilty of any 
negligence in approaching on his \vrong side of 
the highway \vhen there was traffic approaching 
fro1n the opposite direction, and that hy reason 
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prevented fro1n seeing ~aid pick-up truck driven 
hy plain tiff a.s soon as he could or would otherwise 
have seen it had it been upon its proper side of the 
high,vay, or that the plaintiff, J. Harold Mitchell, 
\Vas thereby prevented from seeing the truck a.s 
soon as he could or \vould otherwise have seen it, 
and that such negligence on the part of plaintiff 
proxin1ately contributed in any degree to cause 
the collision, then plaintiff cannot recover, and 
your verdict should be in favor of defendants and 
against the plaintiff, no cause of action, even if 
you should find there was also negligence on the 
part of the defendant, l\1:arvin C. \Tan Patten." 
(R. 90-91). 
The defendants' position in this respect is without 
merit. The defendants "\vhile op.erating their truck were 
required to \Vatch both sides of the high\vay, particularly 
while passing another vehicle going in the same direc-
tion. ..A.s was pointed out in the cross :examination of 
\:---an Patten, the defendant Van Patten -could not know 
\Vhether it was safe to attempt to pass the Pace car until 
he had surveyed the right side of the high,vay to deter-
mine, for instance, if there was any ear ahead of Pace. lie 
would have to know that in order to form a proper judg~ 
ment as to whether he had sufficient time in view of the 
restricted visibility to get his sixty foot long truck and 
trailer safely ahead of the truck p·roceeding in his di-
rection before any other vehicle approached within 100 
feet from the op~posite direction. (57-7-124, U.C.A. 1943) 
Furthermore, defendants overlooked the fact that 
they claim to have been continually watching both sides 
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of the highway as they were attempting to pass the Pace 
vehicle. (R. 446). Combining the duty of watching both 
sides of the highway, \vith Van Patten's assertion that 
he was perforrning that duty, the defendants were not 
entitled to be surprised by the presence of the plaintiff 
near or straddle the center line. Again if Van Pa~ten 
could see 200 yards ahead of him as he claimed, Van 
J:latten regarding the higlT\vay with watchful eyes could 
have observed the plaintiff in ample tim.e to remain in 
or get back into his proper lane and thus avoid the acci-
dent, traveling as ·he was at the speed of approximately 
twenty miles per hour. 
In their assignment No. 12 the defendants clain1 
the court erred in refusing to give defendants' requested 
Instruction No. 9, in \vhich, in effect, the court \Vas re-
quested to instruct the jury that it was the duty of the 
plaintiff to avoid creating an emergency, and to avoid 
the collision by pulling over on the west shoulder or 
passing in between the Pace vehicle and defendants' 
truck and trailer. Again counsel overlooked the evidence 
in the case from which the conclusion is compelling that 
whatever emergency existed was created by the reckless 
folly of \Tan Patten, and the defendants had no right to 
ask the court to tell the jury that Mitchell should place 
his car in the path of the innocent Pace vehicle rather 
than in their own where the plaintiff rightfully belonged. 
Nor did they have the right to have the court tell the 
jury that they may find that plaintiff wa.s negligent in 
failing to pa.ss between the Pace vehicle and defendants' 
truck. There 'vas nothing in the record to indicate that 
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plaintiff had any opportunity to take that alternative 
nor is there anything- in the record to indicate that there 
'Yas sufficient roon1 bet,veen the Pace automobile and 
the defendants' truck for plaintiff to pass through un-
scathed. We shudder at the contemplation of the re-
sult 'vhich 'Yould hav-e necessarily ensued if plaintiff 
had attempted to sandwich himself bet,veen the two 
vehicles in order to avoid the accident, assuming that 
he had the opportunity to do so; and counsel have the 
effontery to urge this amazing proposition despite the 
court's Instruction No. 14 "\Vhich permitted the jury to 
find from the evidence that plaintiff was responsible for 
the en1ergency created by plaintiff's unlawful attempt 
to pass another vehicle in a dust storm. (R. 71) 
In their assignment of error No. 14 the defendants 
con1plained of the court's failure to give their requested 
instruction to the effect that the jury might find that 
the plaintiff 'vas negligent in driving at all in the dust 
storm. Defendants' position here approaches the testi-
Inony of \;an Patten in achieving the ultimate of incon-
sistency-. At a time when defendant claimed. to be able 
to see 200 yards ahead and at a time that Van Patten 
vvas on the wrong side of the road flamboyantly passing 
another vehicle defendants now urge that plaintiff was 
required to take his vehicle into the field. They make 
this assertion in spite of the uncontradicted testimony of 
l\iitchell, corroborated by the other passengers in the 
~fitchell car, that ~Iitchell was actually in th.e process 
of pulling his car off the road when the impact occurred . 
. 
The defendants also make this assertion at the same 
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ti1ne acknowledging that the court in its instruction No. 
10 told the jury that if conditions of visibility were such 
that plaintiff or defendant Van Patten could not as-
certain or determine his' position on the highway or 
could not see approaching traffic, then it became the 
duty of each to pull off onto the shoulder on his right 
hand side of the highway. 
In their assignment of error No. 10 the defendants 
co1nplain of the language in the last line of the instruc-
tion. The strained interpretation placed upon the in-
struction by the defendants is unwarranted. Counsel di-
rects the eourt's attention to the last paragraph of ·the 
instruction, we direct the ·court's attention to the instruc-
tion in its entirety, which is as follows: 
''You are instructed that while plaintiff 
claims that the defendant, Marvin C. Van Patten, 
was under a duty to drive and operate the truck 
he was driving at a reasonable speed, having due 
regard for the conditions then and there existing, 
it was also the duty of the plaintiff to likewise 
drive a.t a reasonable and prudent speed, having 
due regard to such conditions. 
''You are further instructed that if conditions 
of visibility -vvere such that plaintiff or defendant 
Van Patten could not ascertain or determine his 
position on the highway, or such that they could 
not see approaching traffic, then it became the 
duty of each to pull off onto the shoulder on his 
right hand side of the highway, if necessary, to 
avoid a collision in the exercise of reasonable and 
ordinary care. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
133 
'~Therefore, if you find from the evidence 
that plaintiff or defendant \Tan p·atten was unable 
to see his true position on the highway and con-
tinued to drive at a speed which was not reason-
able and prudent under the conditions then and 
there existing, then the one violating this duty 
was negligent.'' 
Obviously, if the high,vay conditions required one 
ear to stop, it required them both and the jury could not 
possibly have been misled hy the last line as counsel 
would have us believe. 
Point 5. The court did not err itn denying 
defendants' motion fo•r .a new t:rrol. 
After the verdict was returned, counsel for the de-
fendants contacted the jurors and obtained affidavits 
from seven of them including the affidavit of the fore-
man (R. 122) which they set forth in their brief at page 
63. Each of the seven jurors that furnished affidavits at 
the instance of the defendants furnished another affi-
davit to a contrary effect. Representative of 1the ·counter-
davits is the one obtained from the foreman Stirling E. 
Tanner, \vhich we quote as follows: 
''Stirling E. Tanner, being first duly sworn 
on oath, deposes and says : That he is one of the 
jurors and foreman on the trial of the above enti-
tled case, wherein a verdict "\vas returned on Mon-
day, April 26, 1958; that the amount of the verdict 
was determined in the following manner: 
''We first agreed to return a verdict for the 
plaintiff. We then allowed the sp.ecial damages 
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of $1638.50 on the first cause of action and 
$1264.00 on the second cause of action. We then 
added $16,591.72 from the annuity table, plus 
$900.00 for wages to plaintiff's brother during 
1947. We differed as to the amount to be paid for 
pain and suffering, and after discussion we had 
difficulty in coming to an agreement. It was pro-
posed that we sub!ffiit an amount on a slip of paper 
for the purpos.e of determining how widely we 
were apart, and for the purpose of totaling the 
various sums together to arrive a:t an average. If 
the average vvas a fair one, and if everyone ac-
cepted that average, then that was to constitute 
the amount to be allowed for 'pain and suffering. 
The figures submitted on the slips of paper were 
handed to 1ne and I had the figures divided by 
eight, which gave a result of $1190-(a.pproxi-
Inately $1200). The jurors discus-sed this figure 
and decided that it 'vas a fair one, and it was 
accepted a.s a fair and proper award for pain and 
suffering, and incorporated into the verdict. 
There was no understanding or agreement among 
the jurors before the ballot was submitted and the 
average taken that they would be bound by the 
result, and after the averake was taken there was 
discussion among the jurors as to whether or not 
such average was reasonable,-to which all of the 
jurors agreed. 
·'The former affidavit which I signed in this 
matter was prepared by 1Ir. Edwin B. Cannon 
in his own "\Vords, and since making said affidavit 
my attention has been called thereto, and especi-
ally to the following language; "We also agreed 
to adopt the average as our verdict, after includ-
ing the amounts hereinabove mentioned. We each 
submitted a figure by secret ballot and they were 
then handed to me and I added the figures and 
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diYided by eight, \\"hich gave a result of $1200, 
w··hich governed our final verdict without further 
deliberation. Adding all of the figures was 
cheeked by son1e of the jurors, but there was no 
further deliberation after we ·computed 'tlhe ·aver-
age of $1200 as to pain and suffering. On my slip 
I put nothing for pain and suffering but consented 
to the result because of our p·revious agreement.'' 
·~At the tune I 1nade said affidavit I did not 
observe the language quoted above, or notice the 
effect of it, and especially the words 'which figure 
governed our final verdict without furthe-r delib-
eration,' and 'there was no further deliberation 
after "\Ye computed the average,' and 'consented 
to the result because of our previous agreement.'' 
for it is not true that before said average was 
con1puted there was any agreement or under-
standing that the jury, or any member of the 
jury, would be bound by said average as and for 
the verdict of the jury; but I, as w·ell as every 
other n1ember of the jury, was at liberty to accept 
or reject the average, and, after the averake was 
taken, there was a further deliberation in the 
sense that the jurors discussed the average figure, 
determined it to be fair, and expressed a willing-
ness to accept it as each man's estimate, and I 
concurred in the verdict because I deemed the 
amount to be fair." (R .. 137 -138) 
It 'vill appear from the above affidavit of the fore-
man that nothing irregular occurred in the jury room 
\Vhich could provide defendants with a basis for a new 
trial. The only juror who did not provide both parties 
with an affidavit furnished one at the instance of the 
plaintiff, -the affidavit being in his own language and as 
follows: 
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''B. F. Lofgren, being first duly sworn on 
oath, deposes and says: That he is one of the 
jurors on the trial of the above entitled cause, 
wherein a verdict was returned Monday, April 
26, 1948. 
''My recollection is that the amount of the 
verdict in the above entitled case was arrived 
at in the following manner: 
''We first agreed to return a verdict for the 
plaintiff. Special damages were then discussed 
and we agreed to allow $1638.50. On the second 
cause of action we allowed $1264.00. 'The question 
of loss of earning power was discussed, and it 
was agreed to allow an amount which would pro-
vide approximately $100.00 per month for the 
plaintiff's expected life,-the exact amount was 
taken from the annuity table to be $16,591.72. The 
amount of $900.00 was allowed for wages paid 
plaintiff's brother, due to plaintiff's past loss 
of earning power. 
''On the question of damage for pain and 
suffering there was little basis for arriving at an 
amount. It was agreed that each juror should 
submit his estimate to the foreman to find how 
widely these separate estimates varied. The fore-
man found the average of the separate estimates 
to be approximately $1200.00, and the separate 
estimates varied from zero to about $2,000.00. 
The foreman announced the average and the jur-
ors discussed whether that amount could be con-
sidered a fair allowance. The amount of $1200.00 
was adopted and the total verdict was then added 
and adopted by the jurors." (R. 239-140) 
In view of the explanations furnished by the seven 
in their second affidavits and in view of the affidavit of 
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the eighth juror, ~Ir. Lofgren, there can be no question 
but \Yhat the defendants have altogether failed to dis-
charge their burden of proving the irreg·ular calculation 
of the verdict in this case. Defendants are in no position 
to complain that the jurors fron1 'vho1n they obtained 
the affidavits altered and explained their position in a 
subsequent affidavit. If counsel was diss'atisfied with the 
state of the record, we would have w,elcomed an exam-
ination of the jurors before the court upon the hearing 
of the motion for new trial. The only juror who did not 
furnish t\YO affidavits in this ease established the regu-
larity of the proceeding in the jury room. It is signifi-
cant that each of the seven jurorR asserted in his sec-
ond affidavit that the first affidavit was not prepared 
by the affiant and was not given in his own words. 
Son1e of the affiants directly asserted that the language 
of the affidavit ''Tas the language of Mr. Cannon. (R. 
135-149) 
It follows that the court properly overruled the de-
fendants' motion for new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
The record in the case a.t bar discloses that the de-
fendants were given a full and fair trial and that the 
verdict of the jury was fully justified by the evidence 
and \vas in all respects fair and just. The defendants 
have not shown any error on the part of the trial court 
rnaterial and prejudicial to their substantial rights. In-
deed, the trial court in its instructions to the jury gave 
the defendants more consideration than 1the evidence war-
ranted. We, therefore, earnestly submit that the judg-
rnen t of the court below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE, MECHAM & WHITE 
Att;orneys for P~ain~iff and 
Respondent. 
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